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MARY HOLPER∗ 
Specific Intent and the Purposeful 
Narrowing of Victim Protection Under 
the Convention Against Torture 
ean Etienne, a native of Haiti, is a lawful permanent resident of the 
United States who was convicted for possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute, a conviction that subjects him to both mandatory 
detention and deportation under U.S. immigration law.1  He already 
served a sentence in the United Stat es yet, in Haiti, he will face 
potentially indefinite detention in an overcrowded, dirty prison cell 
with little food or clean water.2  The purpose for t his detention is 
preventive3: the Haitian government wants to keep bad guys like Jean 
Etienne off the streets of the country and deter these offenders fro m 
committing future crimes.4  Compounding his problem, Jean is HIV-
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law  and Director of the Immigration Law  Clinic, Roger 
Williams University School of Law.  I would like to thank Evangeline Sarda and  Amy 
Reichbach for reviewing numerous early dr afts of this Article  and supporting me  
throughout the writing process.   Thanks al so to Dan Kanstroom,  Bob Bloom, Mike 
Cassidy, Ragini Shah, Rachel Rosenbloom, Amy Wax, and Ben Krass for their he lpful 
comments.  I als o would like to t hank Sean Smith and Mark Gord on for their valuabl e 
research assistance. 
1 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1226(c) (2006).  Jean Etienne is a fictitious character; 
however, his story is based on the facts of a real case in which the author was involved. 
2 Richard Chacon, Imprisoned by Policy, Convicts Deported by US Languish in Haitian 
Jails, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2000, at A1; Gary Marx, New Life Is No Life for U.S. Ex-
Cons in Haiti, CHI. TRIB., May 17, 2007, at C1. 
3 See In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 300 (B.I.A. 2002). 
4 Id. at 300 (citing Letter from William E. Dilday, Dir. of Office of Country Reports and 
Asylum Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Immigration Judge ( Apr. 12, 2001); BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HAITI: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES 2000 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/ 
795.htm); Amy Bracken, Influx of Deportees Stirs Anger in Haiti: Some Believe US Policy 
Helped Boost Crime Rate, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2007, at A6. 
J 
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positive and relies on medications to survive; the Haitian officials will 
not provide him with these medications in detention.5 
Jean Etienne can s eek protection under Articl e 3 of the Unite d 
Nations Convention Agai nst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhum an or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),6 which the United States 
ratified in 1998.7  Article 3 protects so meone like Jean Etienne fro m 
removal8 to a country “where there are substantial grou nds for 
believing that he would be in dange r of being subjected to torture ,”9 
regardless of the crimes that subjected him to removal.10  However, in 
2002, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decided  that 
applicants like Jean Etienne, who fear imprisonment in such atrocious 
conditions upon their arrival in Ha iti, could not seek such protection 
because they could not prove that the Haitian government specifically 
intended to cause them severe pain or suffering. 11  Under the BIA ’s 
definition of specific intent, such petitioners must prove that the 
Haitian government will detain them with the precise purpose of 
causing severe pain or suffering.12 
Specific intent is a cri minal law term.13  So, why is it implicated 
when someone seeks protection under the CAT?  T he United States 
modified the definition of torture under the CAT by  conditioning the 
 
5 See ALTERNATIVE CHANCE, WHERE AM I?: A GUIDE TO ADJUSTING TO HAITI 
AGAINST YOUR WILL, SURVIVING DETENTION IN POLICE STATION HOLDING CELL AND 
HOW TO AGITATE FOR YOUR RELEASE (2007), http://www.alternativechance.org/ 
WHERE-AM-I-A-Guide-to-Adjusting-to-Haiti-Against-Your-Will-Excerpt-. 
6 United Nations Convention Agains t Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114 [hereinafter CAT]. 
7 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. XXII, § 2242, 
112 Stat. 2681, 2681–822 (1998).  The implementing regulations are 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-
208.18 (2009). 
8 The 1996 reforms to the Immigrat ion and Nationality Act discontinued the use of the 
term “deportation” and replaced it with “removal.”  See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. III, § 301, 110 
Stat. 3009-546, 3009-575. 
9 CAT, supra note 6, art. 3, para. 1, at 114. 
10 No exceptional circumstances justify e xpelling a person to a country where there 
would be danger  of being subjected to torture.  See 8 C.F.R. § 2 08.17 (2009); David  
Weissbrodt & Is abel Hörtreiter, The Principle of Non-Refouleme nt: Article 3 of the 
Convention Against Torture and  Other Cruel, Inhuma n or Deg rading Treatment or 
Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International 
Human Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 15 (1999). 
11 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 300 (B.I.A. 2002). 
12 Id. at 301. 
13 See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(e) (2d ed . 
2003). 
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treaty’s ratification up on an understanding that “intentionally 
inflicted” severe pain or s uffering means that such pain or suffering 
must be “specifically intended.”14  The meaning of “specific intent,”  
however, is not self-evident.  The phrase is an antiquated criminal law 
term15 that sometimes means only purposeful conduct,16 other times 
means acting pur posefully or knowing that the forbidden 
consequences are forese eable,17 or on occasion means acting with 
willful blindness to the foreseeable consequences.18  In the decision 
In re J-E-, the BIA chose the most narrow definition, “purposeful,” in 
its interpretation of  the C AT and, in doing so, shift ed the focus  in 
CAT protection cases off the victim and onto the alleged torturer.19 
In this Article, I argue t hat the BIA has adopted  a m isguided 
approach to CAT protection that creates an insurmountable obst acle 
to actually obtaining such protection.20  As a solution, I propose that 
Attorney General Eric Holder, under t he new Obama ad ministration, 
adopt a revised definition of specific intent that includes “knowing 
that severe p ain or suffer ing is forese eable.”  Suc h a definition is 
consistent with the legislative histor y and purpose of the CAT and 
finds ample support in criminal law jurisprudence.21  In addition, this 
definition of specific intent is used by the Office of Legal Counsel of 
the U.S. De partment of Justice in its  analysis of whether cer tain 
interrogation techniques would subject Central Int elligence Agency 
operatives to prosecution under the CAT. 22  An alternative solution is 
for U.S. courts to employ a “knowledge of foreseeable consequences” 
definition of specific intent in CAT p rotection cases.  Courts can 
adopt this definition notwithstanding the principles of agency 
 
14 S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. 
REP. NO. 101-30, at 9 (1990) [hereinafter CAT REPORT]. 
15 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403–04 (1980). 
16 See, e.g., United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995). 
17 See, e.g., United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273 (4th Cir. 1979). 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985). 
19 See In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 298–99 (B.I.A. 2002). 
20 See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir. 2003). 
21 See infra Parts II.A and III.B and cases cited therein. 
22 Memorandum from Daniel Levi n, Acting A ssistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to the Deputy 
Att’y Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Memo], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
olc/18usc23402340a2.htm. 
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deference embodied in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. (Chevron).23 
Part I discusses the drafting of the CAT, the definition of “torture” 
under Article 1 of the treaty, and the two understandings that the U.S. 
Senate inserted during the ratification of the treat y: (1) that t he 
definition of torture include a specific intent requirement and (2) that 
applicants for protection under Article 3 of the CAT prove the y are 
more likely than not to suffer torture.  Part II discusses the meaning of 
specific intent in domestic criminal law to give context to the Senate’s 
specific intent understanding.  Part III describes the BIA’ s 
interpretation of the “specific intent” and “m ore likely than not”  
understandings in its 2002 decision In re J-E-.  This Part highlights 
problems with the BIA’s appro ach, which ignor es criminal law 
precedent on specific intent and, in selecting a narr ow definition of  
specific intent, views Article 3 c ases as prosecutions of a  criminal 
defendant accused of torture, not as ev aluations of the likely  harm to 
the victim.  Part IV illustrates these differing viewpoints of Articl e 3 
protection by exam ining recent deci sions by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, whic h has analyzed the specific int ent 
requirement of CAT protection in several ca ses in recent years.  Part 
V proposes a “knowing of  the for eseeable consequences” definition 
of specific intent, which is more consistent with the purpose of Article 
3 protection and the legislative history of the treaty’s U.S. ratification.  
This Part also argues that this definition of specific intent finds ample 
support in criminal law jurisprudence and in the 2004  Office of Legal 
Counsel memorandum regarding whether certain interrogat ion 
techniques would subject U.S. troops to prosecution under the CAT.  
Part VI proposes that the  U.S. Depart ment of Just ice modify its 
definition of specific intent in CA T protection cases; in the 
alternative, courts should adopt this more generous reading of specific 
intent.  Part VI also examines policy concerns that the U.S. Attorney  
General must address to i mplement this solution, and addresses  how 
the doctrine of Chevron deference does not prevent courts from 
adopting a more equitable definition of specific intent. 
 
23 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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I 
BACKGROUND 
Torture and other cruel, inhum an, and degrading treatment or 
punishment is prohibi ted pursuant to several hum an rights 
instruments,24 including the Universal De claration of Human  
Rights.25  In 1974, the U nited Nations (UN) General Assem bly 
directed the UN Congress “‘to give urgent attention to the question of 
the development of an internati onal code of ethics for police and 
related law enforcement agencies’” and “‘to include, in the  
elaboration of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, rules for the protection of all persons subjected to any form 
of detention or imprisonment against torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishm ent.’”26  One y ear later, the U N 
General Assembly adopted the Declaration on  the Protection of All 
Persons Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhum an or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.27  Subsequently, several bodies 
under the auspices of the United Nations drafted t he CAT.28  The 
CAT was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 
1984.29  Its principal aim  was not to outlaw torture and other cruel,  
inhuman, or degrading tre atment or punishment; the CAT is based  
upon the recognition that these practices are already outlawed under  
 
24 Prohibitions of torture and oth er cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment o r 
punishment are found in Article 7 of the  1966 International Covenant on  Civil and 
Political Rights, Article 3 of  the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 5 of the 1969 American Convention on Human 
Rights, Article 5 of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 7 of 
the 1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human  Rights, the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
concerning humanitarian law applicable to armed c onflicts, and the 1955 U.N. Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners .  J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS 
DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON 
THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING 
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 11–12 (1988). 
25 Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “No one shall be  
subjected to torture or to crue l, inhuman or degrading treatme nt or punishme nt.”  
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
26 BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 14–15  (quoting a draft resolution of the 
1974 UN General Assembly). 
27 Id. at 17. 
28 The UN General  Assembly, the UN Commission on Human Rights, and working  
groups established by the Commission all contribut ed to the drafting  of the CAT.   Id. at 
31. 
29 Id. at v. 
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international law.30  R ather, its purpose was “to strengthen the 
existing prohibition of such practices.”31 
The United States, which engaged in seven years of negotiations 
regarding the CAT,32 advocated for a limited definition of “tortur e,” 
including only extreme forms of cruel, inhum an, or degra ding 
treatment or punishm ent.33  Despite other countries’ attem pts to 
expand the definition of “torture,” the United Stat es succeeded in 
defining torture as “sever e” pain or suffering. 34  The United States 
also negotiated, unilaterally, to limit the definition of “torture” to acts 
“specifically intended.”35  However, the definition of tort ure 
ultimately included all “intentional” acts.36 
The definition of “torture” under Article 1 of the CAT is: 
any act by which severe pain or s uffering, whether physical or 
mental, is in tentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a t hird person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, 
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.  It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.37 
 
30 Id. at 1. 
31 Id.  As such, the CAT proposed to  “make more effective the struggle  against torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degr ading treatment or punishment throughout the world.”  
CAT, supra note 6, preamble, at 113. 
32 CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 2. 
33 AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS 
FOR ENFORCEMENT 16–17 (1999); BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 40. 
34 BOULESBAA, supra note 33, at 16. 
35 “The U.S. was the only cou ntry that was not satisfied with the term ‘intentionally.’  
No other State commented on it; it invited no serious discussion from the Working Group 
and the U.S.’s proposal was not adopted.”  Id. at 20.  In addition, the United States sought 
to limit the definition of torture to acts that w ere “deliberately and maliciously inflicted on 
a person.”  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 41. 
36 CAT, supra note 6, art. 1, para. 1, at 113–14; BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, 
at 118 (“[T]orture must be an intentional act.  It follows that where pain or suffering is the 
result of an accident or of mere negligence, th e criteria for regarding the act as torture  are 
not fulfilled.”).  “Torture” is defined in Article 1 of the CAT; Articles 1 through 16 contain 
the substantive p rovisions of the treaty.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 2 4, at 1.  
Articles 17 through 24 contain the implementation provisions.  Id. 
37 CAT, supra note 6, art. 1, para . 1, at 113–14 .  While Article 1 re lates to acts th at 
amount to torture, Article 16 rel ates to the other acts of cruel, inhuman, or de grading 
treatment or punishment prevented  by the  CAT.  Article 16 obligates signatories of the 
CAT to prevent the following in their own territories: 
 2009] Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing of Victim Protection 783 
Article 3 of the CAT contains a protective feature that was inspire d 
by international human rights instruments.38  This protection prohibits 
signatories from expelling, returning, or extraditing a person to a 
country “where there are substan tial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”39 
A.  The CAT in U.S. Immigration Law 
On April 18, 1988, the United States sig ned the CAT and reserved 
the right t o communicate, upon ratification, such reservati ons, 
interpretive understandings, or decl arations as were deemed  
necessary.40  P resident Ronald Reagan transm itted the CAT to the 
Senate for advice and consent in M ay 1988, proposing a li st of 
reservations, understandings, and declarations, which were revised  
and resubmitted by President George H.W. Bush i n January 1990.41  
 
other acts of crue l, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not 
amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public off icial or other 
person acting in an official capacity. 
Id. art. 16 , para. 1, at 116.  The drafters of the CAT recognized that, unlike defining 
torture, it was impossible to draft a precise  definition of other “cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”  For th is reason, the CAT co uld not impose legal 
obligations (i.e., preventing deportation under Ar ticle 16) on countries if the obligations 
stemmed from a vague concept like cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment.  
BOULESBAA, supra note 33, at 8. 
38 Article 3 has no equivalent in the 1975 Declaration on the Protectio n of All Persons 
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Crue l, Inhuman or Deg rading Treatment or 
Punishment.  “The article had been inspired by the c ase-law of the European Commission  
of Human Rights with regard to ar ticle 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.” 
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 125 .  The European Commission decided that 
“the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment in article 3 of the European 
Convention” not only obligates countries to prevent torture within their own territories, but 
also to re frain from sending a pe rson to a country  where the deportee would face s uch 
treatment.  Id.  The original draft of Article 3 of th e CAT referred only to expulsion and 
extradition; the r eference to return or “ref oulement” was adde d “with article 33 of the  
Refugee Convention as an obvious source of inspiration.”  Id. at 126. 
39 CAT, supra note 6, art. 3, para. 1, at 114.  Article 3 obligates coun tries to protect 
persons only from a return to a c ountry where the deportees would suffer torture, bu t the 
law does not req uire that countries protect persons from return to a country wh ere the 
deportees would be subjected t o other cr uel, inhuman, or de grading treatment or 
punishment.  See id.  The original draft proposed t hat there should be reasonable grounds 
for believing that the person would be subjected to torture; the term “substantial” was later 
substituted in order to make the wording more precise.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 
24, at 127.  “The question as to whether or not such substantial gro unds exist in a given 
case must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of that case.”  Id. 
40 CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 2–4. 
41 Id. at 2, 7–11. 
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In August 1990, the Senate adopted a resolution of advice and consent 
that incorporated these reservations, under standings, and 
declarations;42 President Clinton t hen deposited the instrument of 
ratification with the United Nations in October 1994.43 
Because the CAT was not self-exe cuting,44 Congress adopted it 
into law through the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 
1998 (FARRA)45 and required the appropriate agencies to promulgate 
regulations within 120 days.46  The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
promulgated these regulations in 1999, 47 creating tw o defenses t o 
removal under the CAT: withholdi ng of rem oval and deferral of 
removal.48  Once an applicant for withholding or deferral of rem oval 
under Article 3 of the CAT proves the likelihood  of torture in the 
country to which the applicant will be rem oved, the United States 
 
42 Id. at 1. 
43 BOULESBAA, supra note 33, at 12 n.2. 
44 The Senate’s adv ice and consent to the ratification of the CAT was  subject to the 
declaration that Articles 1 through 16 of the  law were not self-executing.  CAT R EPORT, 
supra note 14, at 10. 
45 Foreign Affairs Reform and Rest ructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. XXII, § 
2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822 (1998).  FARRA § 2242(a) states: 
It shall be the po licy of the U nited States not to expel,  extradite, or otherw ise 
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are  
substantial grounds for believing the person wo uld be in dange r of being 
subjected to torture, regardless of whethe r the person is physically present in the  
United States. 
Id. § 2242(a), 112 Stat. at 2681–822. 
46 Id. § 2242(b), 112 Stat. at 2681–822. 
47 Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478 (Feb. 19, 
1999). 
48 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2009).  Both withholding and deferral of remov al under the CAT 
use the same definition of “torture.”  See id.  A grant of deferral of removal under the CAT 
can be more easi ly revoked than a grant of withh olding of removal.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 
208.16, 208.17(d) (2009); Regula tions Concerning the Con vention Against Torture, 64 
Fed. Reg. at 8481–82. 
Under existing regulations, withholding can only be terminated  when the 
government moves to reopen the case, meets the standards for reopening, and  
meets its burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
alien is not eligible for withholdi ng.  The termination process for deferral of 
removal is designed to b e much more accessib le, so that d eferral can be  
terminated quickly and efficiently when appropriate. 
Regulations Concerning the Co nvention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. at 8 482.  
Withholding of removal under the CAT, h owever, is not available to persons who h ave 
been convicted of a “particularly serious crime”; whereas d eferral of removal under  the 
CAT has no criminal bar.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(d)(2), 208.17. 
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may not send the applicant to that country.49  These defenses are often 
the only available relief f or noncitizens who cannot prove a case of  
asylum or nonrefoulem ent (nonreturn) under the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Ref ugees (Refugee 
Convention)50 because these individuals cannot demonstrate a nexus 
between the harm feared and a protected ground. 51  In addition, 
deferral of rem oval under the CAT is often the onl y defense for 
applicants whose criminal record bars t hem from seeking other relief 
from removal.52 
 
49 Relief under Article 3 of the CAT  is mandatory, n ot discretionary.  See 8 C.F.R. § 
208.16(c)(4) (“If the immigration judge determines that the alien is more likely than not to 
be tortured in the country of r emoval, the alie n is entitled to protection under the  
Convention Against Torture.”). 
50 The U.N. Convention Relating to the Status  of Refugees is binding  on the United 
States through its accession to the U.N. Protoc ol Relating to the Status of Refuge es.  
Convention Relating to the Statu s of Ref ugees, July 28, 1951 , 19 U.S.T. 6 223, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150 [h ereinafter Refugee Conventi on]; Protocol Relating to the Sta tus of 
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.  Article 33 of the Ref ugee 
Convention prohibits refoulement (returning) of a refugee to territories if the refugee’s li fe 
or freedom would be threatened.  Refugee Conve ntion, supra, art. 33.1, 189 U.N.T.S. at 
176.  The law regarding nonrefoulement, which is referred to as “withholding of removal,” 
is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b )(3) (2006).  Asylum, which ma y be granted in the 
Attorney General’s discretion to anyone who meets the definition of a “refugee” under the 
Refugee Convention, was create d through the Refugee Act of 1980.   THOMAS 
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 
847–49 (6th ed. 2008).  For the law relating to asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006). 
51 Asylum seekers and applicants for the withholding of removal u nder 8 U.S .C. § 
1231(b)(3) must demonstrate tha t the feared pers ecution is on ac count of their ra ce, 
religion, nationality, political opinion,  or membership in a p articular social group.   See 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b), 1231(b)(3) (2006); INS v. Eli as-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 
478, 481 (1992).  Applicants for protection under Article 3 of the CAT, however, need 
only demonstrate that they will face torture; the torture can be infli cted for any reaso n 
whatsoever.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 125.  For example, Haitian criminal 
deportees such as Jean Etienne  have unsucc essfully argued that they would su ffer 
persecution on a ccount of their membership in  a particular social group, i.e ., Haitian 
criminal deportees.  See Toussaint v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 455 F.3d 409, 418 (3d Cir. 
2006); Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d  392, 397 (1st Cir. 2004).  Such applicants could o nly 
seek protection under Article 3 of the CAT. 
52 For example, noncitizens who have been c onvicted of “particularly  serious crimes” 
are not eligible f or asylum or withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3 ).  8 
U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006); see also In re  N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 336, 342–43 (B.I.A. 2007) (describing the analysis used by the BIA for determining 
whether an offense is a “particularly serious  crime”).  An “aggravated felony” conviction 
is enough to dis qualify an applic ant from as ylum.  8 U.S.C § 11 58(b)(2)(B)(i).  An 
“aggravated felony” conviction with a five-year sentence is eno ugh to disqualify an  
applicant from withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C § 1231(b)(3)(B).  The offenses that 
qualify as “aggravated felonies” can be as mi nor as a misdemeanor shoplifting crime with 
a suspended sentence of one year.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2006).  The BIA has 
also held that certain types of offenses (e.g ., drug trafficking crimes) are per se 
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The Senate adopted an understanding that furt her defined th e 
prohibition in Article 3 on expelling, returning, or extraditing a person 
to a country “where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be i n danger o f being su bjected to to rture.”53  This 
understanding required that an applicant for protection under the CAT 
prove it is “more likely than not that he would be [tortured].”54  This 
standard was already in use in U.S.  law applying the Refu gee 
Convention.55  U.S. application of t he nonreturn provisions of th e 
Refugee Convention requires a showing that an appl icant more likely 
than not will be persecuted on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social 
group.56  The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted thi s standard in the 
context of the Refugee Convention and confirmed that the applicant 
must show a fifty-one percent likelihood of persecution.57 
 
“particularly serious crimes” that will disqua lify an applicant from a sylum or withholding 
of removal.  See In re  Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274–77 (B.I.A. 2002) .  T here is a 
“particularly serious crime” bar to  withholding of removal under the CAT; howev er, there 
is no crime bar to deferral of removal.  8 C.F .R. §§ 208 .16(d)(3); 208.17 (200 9); 
Weissbrodt & Hörtreiter, supra note 10, at 16 (d escribing that the drafters of Article 3 of 
the CAT delibera tely did not adop t the limi tations on nonrefoulement included in other  
treaties, such as  the “particularly serious crime” bar included in A rticle 33.1 of the 
Refugee Convention, because “no exceptional circumstances justify expelling a person to  
a country where she or he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”).  Therefore, in 
many of the cases discussed in Part IV, infra, the applicant could only apply for deferral of 
removal under the CAT if the person was barre d from asylum or withholding of removal 
due to a “particularly serious cr ime.”  See, e.g., Lavira v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 478 F.3d 
158, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing the phrase “particularly serious crime”). 
53 CAT, supra note 6, art. 3, para. 1, at 114. 
54 CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 10, 16. 
55 Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits a s tate from expelling or returning a  
refugee to territories where the re fugee’s life or freedom would be  threatened.  Refugee 
Convention, supra note 50, art. 33.1, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176. 
56 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). 
57 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447–48 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 
429–30 (1984).  While an applicant for asylum  need only demonstrate a “well-founded 
fear” of persecu tion, which translates to a ten percent likelihood, an  applicant for 
withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) must demonstrate that persecution is  
“more likely than not” to occur,  which translates to a  fifty-one percent like lihood.  
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 458 (Powell, J., dissenting).  The United States adopted the 
more stringent “ more likely than  not” standard for relief under the CAT bec ause the 
Reagan and Bush administrations regarded the nonreturn prohibitio n in A rticle 3 of the 
CAT as analogous to the mandatory withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).  
See Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the S. Co mm. on Foreign Relations, 
101st Cong. 18 ( 1990) [hereinafter CAT Hearing] (statement of  Mark Richard, Deputy 
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (“Because there is no discretion under Article 
3, the low er standard that exists for asylum ( i.e., ‘well founded fear of persecution,’  8 
U.S.C. Sec. 1158) is simply inappropriate.”); CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 10. 
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Since the CAT regulations were pr omulgated in 1999, courts have 
interpreted claims for CAT protection in numerous cases.58  The most 
important cases surround the “specific intent” requirement. 
B.  U.S. Definition of Torture Requires Specific Intent 
The specific intent requirement originated with an u nderstanding 
proposed by President Reagan;59 the U.S. Senate adopted a version of 
Reagan’s understanding,60 which meant  that U.S. obligations under 
 
58 For example, a CAT applicant must prove either th at the torture w ill be inflicted a t 
the hands of a government actor or that the government acquiesces in the torture.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.18(a)(1) (2009); BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 119–20 (“[O]nly torture 
for which the authorities could  be held responsi ble should fall  within the art icle’s 
definition.  If  torture is committed without any in volvement of the  authorities, but as a 
criminal act by p rivate persons, it can be expe cted that the normal machinery of j ustice 
will operate and that prosecution and punishment will follow under the normal conditions 
of the domestic legal system.”).  Some courts hold that a showing  of the governme nt’s 
willful blindness is needed to prove acquiescence .  See, e.g., Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 
1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that gove rnment acquiescence can be proved through  
a demonstration of willful blindness).  But see In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306 , 1311–13 
(B.I.A. 2000) (holding that willful blindness is not sufficient to prove the govern ment 
acquiescence requirement under the CAT). 
59 President Reagan had submitted an understanding “that,  in order to constitute tor ture, 
an act must be a deliberate and calculated act  of an extremely cruel and inhuman natur e, 
specifically intended to inflict excruciating and a gonizing physical or mental pain or  
suffering.”  CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 15; Message from the President of the U nited 
States Transmitting the Co nvention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. Tr eaty Doc. 100-20, at 4 (1988) [hereinafter 
Message from the President] .  The summary and technical analysis of the C AT submitted 
by President Reagan to the Senate stated: 
[T]he requirement of intent to cau se severe pain a nd suffering is o f particular 
importance in the case of alleged mental pain and suffering, as well as in cases 
where unexpectedly severe physical suffering is caused.  Because specific intent 
is required, an act that results in u nanticipated and unintended severity of pain 
and suffering is not torture for purposes of this Convention. 
CAT REPORT, supra note 14 , at 1 3–14; Message f rom the President, supra, at 3.  The 
Senate revised the Reagan administration’s proposed understanding, which was criticized 
for setting too hi gh a threshold of  pain for an act  to constitute torture.  C AT REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 9. 
60 The understanding adopted by the Senate with reference to Article 1 was: 
The United States understands that,  in order to constitute torture, an act must be  
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or s uffering and 
that mental pain  or suffering refers to prolonged  mental harm ca used by or  
resulting from: (1) the intentiona l infliction or threatened infliction of severe 
physical pain or suffering; (2) the  administration or application, or threatened  
administration or application, of  mind altering substances or other  procedures 
calculated to disr upt profoundly t he senses or the personality; (3) the threat of  
imminent death; or (4) the threat th at another person w ill imminently be 
subjected to death, severe physical pain  or suffering, or the admin istration or 
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the CAT b ecame effective in domesti c law subject to this  
understanding.61  Because t he executive branch and Senate saw th e 
CAT as a c odification of an international crime of torture, 62 their 
overriding concerns were to “be clear about what is going t o be 
punished”63 and “to g uard against the i mproper application of t he 
Convention to legitimate U.S. law enforcem ent actions.”64  The DOJ 
advocated for a specific intent requirement to solve the problem of an 
imprecise definition of t orture in A rticle 1: “This definitional 
vagueness makes it ve ry doubtful that the United States can,  
consistent with [c]onstitutional due  process constr aints, fulfill its 
obligation under the Convention to adequately engraft the definition 
of torture into the domestic criminal law of the United States.”65 
 
application of mind altering substances or  other procedures calculated to disrupt 
profoundly the senses or personality. 
CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 9.  In light of this understanding, the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations noted that rough and deplorable treatment, such as police brutality, does 
not amount to torture.  Id. at 13–14. 
61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 314 cmt. d (1986). 
62 CAT Hearing, supra note 57, at 4 (statement of Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal 
Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State) (“The essentia l purpose of this co nvention is to c odify 
international law regarding the crime of tortur e, and to require party states to deter and 
punish acts of torture pursuant to their domestic laws.”).  The State Department stated that 
the approach of the CAT “is more similar to  the terrorism conventions than it is  to the 
genocide convention.”  Id. at 5. 
63 Id.; see also id.  at 3 (statement of Sen. Larry Pressler) (“What happened to the  
requirement in American law . . . that no one  can be sub jected to trial and punishment 
under American law without a statute firs t having defined the crime and then provided for 
a specific punishment?”). 
64 CAT REPORT, supra note 14,  at 15.   Some Senators on the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations expressed conc ern both that several of the “worst violators o f human 
rights” had already signed the CAT and that such countries could haul the United States 
before the Intern ational Court of Justice; a vague definition of “ torture” would make 
unfounded prosecutions of the Un ited States more likely.  See CAT Hearing, supra note 
57, at 1–4 (state ments of Sen. J esse Helms and Sen. Larry Pressler).  The Assistant 
Attorney General for the C riminal Division of the U .S. Department of Justice expressed 
the same concern: 
The Convention places U.S. law enforcement officials, when travelin g overseas, 
at risk of arrest a nd prosecution in fore ign jurisdictions, or even extradition to a 
third country, for purported violations committed within the United States. . . . 
 A related conce rn, flowing from th e definitional problem, is that the  
Convention may be used by some unscrupulous foreign governments as a pretext 
for hostile actions against U.S. officials. 
Id. at 16 (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
65 CAT Hearing, supra note 57, at 15–16 (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
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The DOJ reg ulations tracked this understanding when describing 
who could s eek protection from  removal un der the CAT.  The 
regulation, located in 8 C.F.R. § 208. 18(a), defines torture almost 
exactly as the ter m is defined by Article 1 of the CAT but added a 
specific intent requirement: “In order to constitute torture, an act must 
be specifically intended to inflict severe phy sical or mental pain or 
suffering.  An act that results in unanti cipated or unintended severity 
of pain and suffering is not torture.”66 
II 
SPECIFIC INTENT IN CRIMINAL LAW: WHAT DID THE SENATE 
UNDERSTAND? 
An examination of specific intent in dom estic criminal law is  
necessary to understand the rationale for including a  specific intent  
requirement in the CAT,  which the executive branch and Se nate 
viewed as a n international codification of the crime of torture. 67  
Criminal law was created to redress the harms that a person causes to 
society.68  Because a defendant will receive punishment for producing 
this harm, courts interpreting criminal statutes favor injecting a mens 
rea, or guilty mind, requirement into every  criminal statute.69  This 
canon of statutory interpretation in criminal law, which is known as 
the presumption in favor of scienter, o perates with the goal that the 
innocent actor who accidentally  caused harm  to society  will not be 
punished.70  Traditionall y, legislatures defined a harm that th ey 
 
66 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) (2009).  The DOJ also  supplemented the Article 1 definitio n 
of torture by confining the definition to only extreme forms of cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishmen t.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2) (“Torture is an extreme 
form of cruel and inhuman treatme nt and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhu man 
or degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to torture.”). 
67 See CAT Hearing, supra note 57 , at 3 (statement of Sen. Larry Pressler); id. at 4  
(statement of Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State). 
68 See Bruce Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll’s Mental State or What Is Meant by Intent, 38 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 71, 82 (2001) (“What we are seeking to punish in criminal law is sin, which 
sometimes is referred to by the less religious sounding term, ‘moral desert.’” (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Michael S. Moore, More on Act and Crime , 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1749, 
1751 (1994))). 
69 See United States v. X-Citement Video, In c., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994); Staples v. 
United States, 511 U.S . 600, 618 (1994);  Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 24 6, 252 
(1952). 
70 Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea , 52 HARV. L. REV. 905, 905 (193 9) 
(“Deeply ingrained in human nature is the tenden cy to distinguish intended results from 
accidental happenings.  ‘I didn’t mean to’ is an explanation so frequently accepted that it is 
often one of the early acquisitions  of small ch ildren.”).  Public welfare statutes,  in which 
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sought to pre vent yet allowed courts to decide what mens rea was 
appropriate for a certain punishment.71 
At common law, courts separated culpabilit y into two levels : 
specific and general intent.  “[T ]he most common usage of ‘specific 
intent’ is to designate a s pecial mental element which is required 
above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus 
reus of the c rime.”72  “Hist orically, ‘general intent’  referred to an y 
offense for which the only mens rea required was a blameworthy state 
of mind; ‘specific intent’ was meant to emphasize that the definition 
of the offense expressly required proof of a particular mental state.”73  
For some offenses, “specific intent” designates a heightened level of 
culpability, which demands a harsher punishm ent.74  For ot her 
 
the legislature deems that the harm to society is so great that an actor must be punished for 
causing such harm even if the ca usation was innocent, are an exce ption to th is general 
presumption in favor of scienter.  See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 
280–81 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1922). 
71 See Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law and 
Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 343 (2001) (“Courts assume that 
legislatures have injected (or failed to inj ect) mens rea terms into statutory definition s of 
crimes with little  thought to the precise implications of their actions; instead, it is the  
courts that should determine those implications, through construction of the terms used (or 
not used).”). 
72 LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 5.2(e); see also People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 378 (Cal. 
1969) (“When the definition [of a crime] refers to defendant’s intent to do some further act 
or achieve some additional cons equence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific  
intent.”).  For example, at common law, la rceny requires the taking and carrying away of 
property of another w ith the specific intent to steal the property.  Similarly, common law 
burglary requires a breaking and entry into the dwelling of another with the specific intent 
to commit a felony therein.  LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 5.2(e). 
73 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.06, at 147 (4th ed. 2006).  
For example, at common law, bu rglary was defined as “‘breaking and entering of the 
dwelling of another in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony.’”  Id. (quoting Mondie 
v. Commonwealth of Ky., 158 S .W.3d 203, 207 (Ky. 200 5)).  The  requisite mens rea  
pertains to a future act, the intent to commit a felony, and therefore, the offense requires a 
specific intent.  Id. at 147–48. 
74 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980).  For example, the Supreme Court 
has discussed the  meaning of  specific intent in the context of whether the death  penalty 
was an appropriate punishment; this level of punishment is only proportional to the crime  
if the defendant specifically intend ed to kill.   See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 
(1982) (holding that the impositio n of the death penalty in cases where a felony murderer 
did not intend to  kill violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and  unusual 
punishment); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (“Deeply ingrained in 
our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the crim inal conduct, the more 
serious is the offense, an d, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished .”).  In 
Tison, the Supreme Court held  that a felony murder defendant who su bstantially 
participated in a felony committed with reckless indifference to human life had the specific 
intent necessary to merit the death penalty.  Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.  This case is discussed 
in more detail in Part III. B, infra.  Courts and commentators have also suggested that  the 
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offenses, a specific intent mens rea is necessary to punish som eone 
whose criminalized act does not reflect the ha rm that soc iety 
ultimately sought to prevent.75 
A.  Different Definitions of Specific Intent 
The terms “purpose” and “knowing” are often discussed when  
differentiating between specific and general intent. 76  Actin g 
“purposefully” requires that the de fendant consciously desire the 
forbidden result, whatever the lik elihood of tha t result actually  
occurring from the conduct. 77  Acting “knowingl y” requires that the 
defendant be aware that the result is practically certain to follow from 
the conduct, whatever the defendant’s  desire may be to bring about  
that result.78  According to so me scholars, “[t]he essence of th e 
narrow distinction betw een these tw o culpability levels is the 
presence or absence of a positive desire to cause the result; purpose 
requires a culpabilit y beyond the knowledge of a result’s near 
certainty.”79 
Both state and federal courts have described the differences  
between specific and general inte nt with varying definitions of 
 
distinction between specific and general inte nt evolved as a judicial response to the 
problem of the intoxicated offender; intoxication could negate specific intent but it could  
not negate general intent.  See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 46 (1996) (“Over the 
course of the 19th century, courts carved out an exception to the common law’s traditional 
across-the-board condemnation of the drunk en offender, allowing a jury to co nsider a 
defendant’s intoxication when asse ssing whether he possessed the mental state needed to  
commit the crime charged, where the crime was one requiring a ‘specific intent.’”); United 
States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[D]iminished capacity, like voluntary 
intoxication, generally is only a defense when specific intent is at issue.”); Hood, 462 P.2d 
at 377; Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in D efining Criminal 
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 688 n.33 (1983). 
75 Batey, supra note 71, at 344 (citin g OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON 
LAW 65–75 (1881)).  For example , attempt is a specific intent crime.  Because  the actual 
harm was not completed, there would be no punishment without the concept of specific 
intent.  Id. at 355.   The uncertai nty of whether a crime w as actually committed is  not 
present when the defendant has completed the underlying crime because the completed act 
is itself culpable conduct.  See id. 
76 See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405. 
77 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978). 
78 Id. 
79 Robinson & Grall, supra note 74, at 694; see also Miguel Angel Méndez, A 
Sisyphean Task: The Common La w Approach to Mens Rea , 28 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 407, 
431–32 (1994) ( “Purpose also entails conscious risk creation, but is distinguished from 
knowledge in that an awareness of the consequences that can ensue from the contemplated 
conduct is insufficient to estab lish liability.  A desi re to bring about the consequence s is 
indispensable.”). 
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specific intent.80  For example, so me courts have decided that the 
definition of specific intent should  be limited to onl y purposeful 
conduct.81  Other courts have decided knowin g that a result is 
foreseeable is sufficient to  prove specif ic intent.82  Courts have also 
 
80 The Supreme Court discussed the various definitions of specific intent: 
Sometimes ‘general intent’ is used  in the same way as ‘criminal inte nt’ to mean 
the general notion of mens rea, while ‘specific intent’ is taken to mean the mental 
state required for a particular cr ime.  Or, ‘general intent’ may be used to  
encompass all forms of the menta l state requireme nt, while ‘specific intent’ i s 
limited to the one mental s tate of intent.  A nother possibility is that ‘general 
intent’ will be used to characterize an in tent to do something on an undetermined 
occasion, and ‘specific intent’ to d enote an intent to do that thing at a particular 
time and place. 
Bailey, 444 U.S. at 403 (qu oting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., 
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 28, at 201–0 2 (1972)); see also Liparota v.  United 
States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 n.5 (1985) (“We have also recognized that the mental element in 
criminal law encompasses more t han the tw o possibilities of ‘specific’ and ‘gener al’ 
intent.” (citing Bailey, 444 U.S. at 403–07)); U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at  444–45; 
United States v. Freed , 401 U.S. 601, 613 (1971) (Bren nan, J., co ncurring); 
Commonwealth of Mass. v. Henson, 476 N.E.2d 947, 954 (Mass. 1985) (Hennessey, C.J., 
concurring) (“But ‘specific inte nt’ may not ha ve clear meanin g to all jud ges and 
lawyers.”); Hood, 462 P .2d at 37 7 (“Specific and general intent h ave been notorio usly 
difficult terms to define and apply, and a num ber of text w riters recommend that they be 
abandoned altogether.”). 
81 See, e.g., Callahan v. A.E.V., Inc., 182 F.3d 237, 261 n.15 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Although 
harm to the plaintiffs may have be en a probable ultimate consequence of the defendants’ 
actions, we do not think they specifically intended to cause such har m.”); United States v. 
Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995) (“In short, a specific intent crime is one in w hich 
the defendant a cts not only with knowledge of what he is doing , but does so  with the 
objective of completing some unlawful act.”);  Apodaca v. United States, 188 F.2d 932, 
937 (10th Cir. 1951) (discussing that it was insufficient that the defendants may have had a 
general bad purpose in a prosecution for conspiracy; it was necessary for them to have the 
actual purpose of committing the act alleged in the indictment); Law s v. United States, 66 
F.2d 870, 872 ( 10th Cir. 19 33) (holding that jury instructions on specific intent were 
erroneous when the instructions stated that specific intent could be proved if the defendant 
intended the natural consequence s of the knowin gly committed wrongful act); Stat e v. 
Daniels, 109 So . 2d 896, 899 (L a. 1958) (“[S] pecific intent is present when from the  
circumstances the offender must have subjectively desired the prohibited result; whereas 
general intent exists when from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be 
expected to follow from the offen der’s voluntary act, irrespective of any sub jective desire 
to have accomplished such result.”); Harri s v. State, 728 A.2d 180, 183 (Md. 1999) (“A 
specific intent i s not simply the intent  to do t he immediate act but embraces  the 
requirement that the mind be cons cious of a more r emote purpose or  design which sh all 
eventuate from the doing of the i mmediate act.” (quoting Smith v.  State, 398 A.2d 426, 
443 (Md. 1979))); State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Minn. 19 96) (“[S]pecific intent 
requires that the defendant acted  with the intention to produce  a specific result, such as is 
the case in premeditated murder.”). 
82 See, e.g., Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207 (1893) (interpreting a specific 
intent standard and stating “if the act in question is a natural and prob able consequence of 
an intended wron gful act, then the unintende d wrong may derive its character from the 
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defined specific intent as knowing of the virtual certainty of a result.83  
Still other courts have held that willful blindness 84 is sufficient to 
prove specific intent.85 
B.  The Model Penal Code: A Solution to the Specific and General 
Intent Conundrum 
The Supreme Court commented on  the task of  distinguishing 
between specific and general intent at common law, stating that “[t]he 
administration of the federal system of criminal justice is confided to 
ordinary mortals, whether they be law yers, judges, or jurors. T his 
system could easily fall of its own weight if courts or scholars become 
obsessed with hair-splitting distinctions . . . .” 86  Bec ause so much 
ambiguity existed in the lines drawn between specific and general  
intent, the drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC) moved away from 
this traditional dichotomy of intent in the 1960s.87  The MPC drafters 
 
wrong that was intended”); United States v. Twine,  853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that to prove specific intent, “the level of culpability must exceed a mere 
transgression of an objective standard of acceptable behavior (e.g., negligen ce, 
recklessness)”); United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273 (4th Cir. 1979) (“In our 
view, [to prove specific intent] the defendant need only have had knowledge or notice that 
success in his fraud wo uld have likely resulted in  an obstruction of justice.  Notice is 
provided by the reasonable foreseeability of th e natural and probable consequences of 
one’s acts.”); Co mmonwealth v. Richards, 293 N.E.2d 854, 860, 860 n.3 (Mass. 1973) 
(reasoning that specific intent to murder could be  proved by showing an intent to kill or at  
least knowledge that there was a  substantial chance of killing); P eople v. Lerma, 239 
N.W.2d 424, 426 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (“[I]n order to commit a spe cific intent crime, an 
offender would have to subj ectively desire or  know that the prohibited result w ill occur, 
whereas in a general intent crime, the prohibited re sult need only be reasonably expected 
to follow from the offender’s voluntary act . . . .”). 
83 See, e.g., State v. Gaines, 873 A.2d 688, 693 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
(reasoning that specific intent to murder can  be proved through consciously causing death 
or knowing that death is practically certain to result). 
84 “Willful blindness” is only differe nt from positive knowledge in that the defendant 
made a calculated effort to avoid  knowing the truth, but it “can almost be said that the  
defendant actually knew.”  United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 n.7 (9th Cir. 1 976) 
(quoting GRANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 57, at 159 (2d 
ed. 1961)). 
85 See, e.g., United States v. Schnab el, 939 F .2d 197, 203–04 (4th Cir . 1991); United 
States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 111 4, 1129–30 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Caminos, 770 
F.2d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 1985). 
86 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406–07 (1980). 
87 Id. at 403 n .4; see also Robinson & Grall, supra note 74, at 705 (“ The Model Penal 
Code culpability scheme is a g reat improvement over ‘the var iety, disparity, and 
confusion’ of judicial definitions of ‘the requis ite but elusive mental element’ that existed 
prior to its advent.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 
252 (1952))). 
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replaced the “ambiguous and elastic” t erm “intent” with a hierarchy 
of culpable states of mind.88  The hierarchy includes, from highest to 
lowest degree of culpability, the following states: purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly, and negligent ly.89  The MPC uses an 
“elemental” approach to criminal law, which requires the prosecution 
to prove each material  ingredient of the certain offense with the 
corresponding state of mind.  This  approach allows for a separate 
mens rea to be used for each element of an offense.90 
Following the passage of  the MPC, specific intent is generally 
understood as an im bedded element of a crim inal offense.91  Other 
uses of spe cific intent, such as defi ning a heightened level of 
culpability in order to merit a harsher punishment, became obsolete as 
legislatures followed the MPC by  defining the precise mens rea of a 
criminal offense.92  Under the “m odern view” of mens rea, “it is 
better to draw a distinction betw een intent (or pur pose) on the one 
hand and k nowledge on the other.” 93  This contrasts with the 
traditional view, which defines specific intent in a way  that includes 
purpose and knowledge.94 
The Senate, which ratified the CAT s ubject to t he specific intent 
understanding in 1994,  years after the MPC’s passage, never 
discussed using the MPC  degrees of culpability to make the torture 
definition more precise.95  It  is possible that the Senate intended the 
 
88 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.0 2, cmt. 2  (1962) 
(describing “specific intent” as an “awkward  concept”); Méndez, supra note 79, at 4 30 
(“A solution to the confusion the common-law terms have created is to adopt the mens rea 
terms conceived by the American Law Institute.”). 
89 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). 
90 DRESSLER, supra note 73, § 10.07, at 149. 
91 See LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 5.2(e), at 354. 
92 See id. § 5.2.  However, despite this “modern view” of mens rea, courts still cling to 
the traditional no tions of specific and general intent to define culpability.   See People v. 
Burton, 558 N.E.2d 1369, 1378 (Ill. App. Ct . 1990) (Steigmann, J., conc urring and 
dissenting) (“[R]egrettably the distinction [b etween general and spe cific intent] lives on 
because of the courts’ reluctance to give it up.”); see also Kenneth W. Simons, Should the 
Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 179 
(2003) (“Prior to the MPC,  the prevailing mental state categories included general in tent 
and specific intent, malice aforet hought, and other concepts that were just as  confusing.  
And in many states,  these confusing and infin itely manipulable old concepts are still with 
us.”).  One scholar has commented that courts continue to define specific and gen eral 
intent, even where states have ado pted the MPC hi erarchy, because it gives courts more 
flexibility in determining culpability.  Batey, supra note 71, at 402–03. 
93 LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 5.2, at 340. 
94 See id. 
95 See supra Part I.B. 
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definition of torture to contain an im plied element that req uired 
“purposeful” conduct be cause the to rture definition requires the 
defendant to act with the purpose of obtaining a confession, punishing 
the victim, or intimidating the victim, or for any other reason based on 
discrimination of any  kind.96  However, the “purpose” language of 
the torture definition is relevant to motive, not int ent.97  It also is 
possible that the Senate inserted the specific intent requirement  
merely to clarify  that an unintended causation of severe  pain o r 
suffering is not “torture. ”98  The legislative histor y of the CAT 
ratification does not eluci date what definition of specific intent the 
Senate intended.99 Thus, the  BIA and the courts have grappled wit h 
this antiquated criminal law term and its various meanings.100 
III 
THE BIA’S MISGUIDED APPROACH TO CAT PROTECTION 
The BIA first analyzed the definition of “torture” under the CAT in 
the 2002 In re J-E- case.101  The BIA’s approach to CA T protection, 
particularly its narrow definition of “specific intent,” presents seve ral 
problems, not the least of which is its disregard of established  
criminal law jurisprudence related to the meaning of specific inte nt.  
In choosing such a lim ited definition of specific intent, the B IA 
 
96 CAT, supra note 6, art. 1, para. 1, at 113–14; see also CAT REPORT, supra note 14, 
at 14 (“The requirement of intent  is emphasized i n Article 1 by reference to illust rate 
motives for torture . . . . The purpo ses given are not exhaustive . . . . Rather, they indicate  
the type of motiv ation that typically underlie s torture, and emph asize the requirement for 
deliberate intention or malice.”). 
97 Perkins, supra note 70, at 921 (“ ‘Although sometimes confused, m otive and intent  
are not synonymous terms.’” (quoting People v. Kuhn, 205 N.W. 188, 189 (1925))). 
98 See CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 14 (“Because specific intent is required, an act 
that results in unanticipated and unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture for 
purposes of this Convention.”); see also CAT Hearing, supra note 57, at 10 (Statement of 
Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State) (discussing the concern of 
the Justice Department about clarification of the crime of torture; he states, “We prepared 
a codified proposal which does not raise the high threshold of pain already required un der 
international law, but clarifies the definition of mental pain and suffe ring, and maintains 
the position that specific intent is required for torture”). 
99 See supra Part I.B. 
100 See, e.g., In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. De c. 291, 301 (B.I.A. 2002); see also Paul Pierre v. 
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 528 F.3d 180, 189–91 (3d Cir. 2008); Franck Pierre v. Go nzales, 
502 F.3d 109, 116–20 (2d Cir. 2007); Lavira v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 478 F.3d 158, 168–
72 (3d Cir. 2007); Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 139–48 (3d Cir. 2005); Zu beda v. 
Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 473–75 (3d Cir. 2003) .  In this Article, the first names for 
petitioners Paul Pierre and Franck Pierre are used to distinguish their cases. 
101 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. passim. 
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instituted an approach to Article 3  cases that resembles a prosecution 
of the alleged torturer, not an examination of the harm that the victim 
likely will suffer.  This approach requires an Articl e 3 applicant to 
engage in th e impossible task of pr oving a government’s purpose 
through a for ward-looking prosecution of its future acts.  Thus, t he 
specific intent understanding, which was intended to guard U.S. law 
enforcement actions against prosecu tion for torture, has effectiv ely 
created an impossible hurdle to Article 3 protection. 
A.  In re J-E- 
In In re J-E-, the BIA held that a Haitian man who faced prolonged 
detention in Haiti’s National Penitentiary  because of his status as a 
criminal deported from the United States could not obtain deferral of 
removal under the CAT.102  The applicant presented evidence that the 
National Penitentiary was overcrowded and prisoners there were 
deprived of adequate food, wate r, medical care, sanitation, and 
exercise.103 
The BIA held that t he applicant could not pr ove the Haitian 
authorities specifically intended to inflict severe phy sical or m ental 
pain or suffe ring on crim inal deportees by  placing the m in prison s 
where they would be subjected to these conditions. 104  The BIA used 
general criminal law principles to distinguish between specific intent 
and general intent.  “Specific intent” w as “defined a s the ‘intent to  
accomplish the precise cr iminal act th at one is later charged w ith’ 
while ‘general intent’ commonly ‘takes the form of recklessness . . . 
or negligence.’”105  Apply ing this definition of the specific intent 
requirement under the C AT, the BIA found t hat Haitian authorities 
were intentionally detaini ng criminal deportees knowing that t heir 
detention facilities were su bstandard.  However, that was not enough 
evidence to prove specific intent because there was “no evidence that 
they [were] intentionally and deliberately creating and maintaining 
such prison conditions in order to inflict torture.”106 
 
102 Id. at 304. 
103 Id. at 293. 
104 Id. at 298, 300–01. 
105 Id. at 301 (alteration in original) (quoting B LACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 813–14 (7th 
ed. 1999)). 
106 Id. at 301.  In a l ater decision, the Third Ci rcuit clarified the BIA’s statement in an  
opinion denying CAT relief to a s imilarly situated applicant.  See Auguste v. Ridge, 395 
F.3d 123, 146 (3d Cir. 2005).  There, the Third Circuit held that it was not necessary for 
the government to intend to in flict torture; the government must only intend to inflic t 
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The BIA reasoned that Haiti is an extrem ely poor country and, 
therefore, it was not th e fault of t he government if its  prison 
conditions were deplorable.107  This reasoning negated the applicant’s 
argument that the government maintained these prisons in a hor rible 
state with the  specific intent to cause severe pain or suffering to the 
individuals detained.108  The BIA also pointed to evidence  
demonstrating that the Haitian governm ent was trying to improve the 
conditions in its prisons, further ne gating any specific intent to cause 
severe pain or suffering to its prisoners.109 
The applicant also present ed proof of instances of p olice brutality 
against prisoners, such as burnin g with cigarettes, choking, hooding, 
ear boxing, and electric shock.110  The B IA held that the deliberate 
and vicious acts of police brutalit y against the prisoners, which may  
constitute torture, were  isolated occurrences. 111  There were more 
common acts of rough treatment by the police, but these acts were not 
“severe” enough t o rise t o the level of torture.112  Therefore, the 
applicant was unable to show a fifty -one percent chance of be ing 
tortured.113 
 
severe pain or s uffering.  See id. (“Section 208.1 8(a)(5) only req uires that the act be 
specifically intended to infl ict severe pain and suffering, not that the actor intended to 
commit torture.  The two are distinct and separate inquiries.”). 
107 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301. 
108 Id. at 299. The BIA also reasoned that the Haitian government’s policy of indefinite 
detention was a lawful sanction and, therefore, could not amount to torture under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.18.  Id. at 301.  The BIA cited the legislative history of the United States’s adoption  
of the C AT and reasoned that the ill icit purpose requirement of to rture emphasized the  
specific intent requirement.  Id. at 298.  To explain the Haitian authorities’ motivation for 
such indefinite d etention, the B IA stated that the policy was “designed ‘to prevent th e 
‘bandits’ from in creasing the level of insecurity and crime in the country.’”  Id. at 300 
(quoting BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HAITI: COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2000 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 
2000/wha/795.htm).  The BI A also quoted a U. S. State Department officia l, who wrote 
that Haitian authorities detain cri minal deportees “as a warning and deterrent not  to 
commit crimes i n Haiti.”  Id. (quoting Letter from William E.  Dilday, Dir. of Office of 
Country Reports and Asylum Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Immigration Judge (Apr . 12, 
2001)). 
109 Id. at 301.  The BIA cited the Haitian government’s allowance of groups such as the 
Red Cross to mo nitor prison conditions and assi st prisoners with medical care, food , and 
legal aid.  Id. 
110 Id. at 301–02. 
111 Id. at 302. 
112 The BIA stated that “rough and deplorable treatment, such as police brutality, does 
not amount to torture.”  Id. at 298 (citing CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 13–14). 
113 Id. at 303.  The BIA also interpreted the “more likely than not” standard of the CAT 
in the case In re J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912 (B.I.A. 2006).  In In re J-F-F-, the BIA held 
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B.  In re J-E- Ignores Criminal Law Precedent on Specific Intent 
The BIA’s narrow definition of specif ic intent in t he In re J-E- 
decision disregarded significant cri minal law juris prudence on th e 
meaning of specific intent.  Ma ny courts, includi ng the Supreme 
Court, have decided that the definition of specific intent should not be 
limited to only purposeful conduct.114  In the 1978 case United States 
v. United St ates Gypsum Co. ,115 the Court addressed whether the 
Sherman Antitrust Act required a mens rea for a conviction under the 
 
that a Dominican man was ineligible for deferral of removal under the CAT because  he 
could not sho w that he would m ore likely than not suffer torture.  Id. at 921 .  The 
respondent argued that upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he might not be able to 
take his psychiatric medications, which would cause him to become “ rowdy” and lead the 
Dominican police to arrest him; he then argued it was likely that he would be tortured in 
jail.  Id. at 916–17.  The BIA held that an applicant for protection under the CAT could not 
string together a series of suppositions to m eet the burden of proof when the applicant 
could not show that each step in the hypothetical  chain of events was more likely than not 
to occur.  Id. at 921.  Because th e applicant in  In re J-F-F-  could not show a fifty -one 
percent likelihood that each event in the chain would result in his torture in jail, he was not 
granted CAT relief.  See id. 
114 See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987); United States v. U.S. Gypsum 
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446 (1978); United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Buffalano, 727 F.2 d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.  
Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273 (4th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Joh nson, 24 
M.J. 101, 105 (C.M.A. 19 87) (interpreting speci fic intent in a sabotage case and stating  
that the “limited  distinction betw een knowledge and purpose has not been considered 
important since ‘there is good reason for imposing l iability whether the defendant desired 
or merely knew of the practical certainty of th e results’ . . . . In either circumstance, the 
defendants are c onsciously behaving in a way the  law prohibits, a nd such con duct is a 
fitting object of criminal punishment.” (internal citation omit ted) (quoting L AFAVE & 
SCOTT, JR., supra note 80, § 28, at 197)).  Schola rs have also agreed that specific intent 
should not be limited to purposeful conduct.  See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 73, § 10.04, 
at 130 (“At common law, a person ‘intentionally’ causes the social harm of an offense if: 
(1) it is his desire  (i.e., his co nscious object) to cause the social harm ; or (2) he acts with 
knowledge that the social harm is  virtually certain to occur as a re sult of his  conduct.” 
(footnote omitted)); Batey, supra note 71, at 358 , 368–69, 402 (commenting that specific 
intent is often equated with willful, knowing, or purposeful acts; whereas, general intent is 
commonly equated with recklessness, which m eans the perpetrator was aware of the risk  
of bringing about the result prohib ited by the  statute, but nevertheless chose to run that 
risk); Perkins, supra note 70, at 911 (“Intended c onsequences include those which  (a) 
represent the ve ry purpose for which an act is  done (regardless of likelihood of 
occurrence), or (b) are known to be substantially certain to result (regardless of desire).”).  
In the cri minal law treatise S UBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, which is frequently cited  by 
courts, Wayne R. LaFave states: “Intent has traditionally been defined to include  
knowledge, and thus it is usually said that one in tends certain con sequences when he 
desires that h is acts cause those consequen ces or knows that those consequences  are 
substantially certain to result from his acts.”  LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 5.2, at 340. 
115 U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978). 
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statute.116  Having concluded that intent was a necessary element of a 
criminal antitrust violation, 117 the Court  decided tha t the offense 
contained a specific intent mens rea, 118 which the pros ecution could 
prove by demonstrating the defendant’s knowledge of the anticipated 
consequences of vario us actions.119  The Court held that “[ a] 
requirement of proof not only of this knowledge of likely effects, but 
also of a conscious desire to brin g them to fruition or to vi olate the 
law would see m . . . both unnecess arily cumulative and unduly  
burdensome.”120 
 
116 Id. at 434–43.  The defendants were charged with violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1  for 
engaging in collusion and conspiracy to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize the prices of their 
product and the  terms and conditions of sale thereof,  while also trying to adopt a nd 
maintain uniform methods of packaging and handling their product.  Id. at 427. 
117 Id. at 443. 
118 Id. at 443 n.20, 444. 
119 Id. at 446.  Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed with  
this definition of  specific intent,  stating, “If I were fashioning a new test of  criminal 
liability, I would require proof of a specific purpose to violate the law rather than mere 
knowledge that the defendants’ agreement has had an adverse effect on the market.”  Id. at 
474–75 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). 
120 Id. at 446.  The Court reasoned that the limited distinction between knowledge and 
purpose is not important because “‘there is good reason for imposing liability whether the 
defendant desired or merely  knew of the prac tical certainty of the results.’”  Id. at 445 
(quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT, JR., supra note 80, § 28, at 197).  The Supreme Court 
affirmed its reas oning in United States Gypsum Co. in the 19 79 Sandstrom v. Montana 
decision.  442  U.S. 510 (1979).  In Sandstrom, the Court, deci ding an app eal of a 
deliberate homicide conviction, held that a jury instruction indicating that “the law 
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts” violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment due p rocess requirement, which obligat es the State to prove  
every element of a criminal offens e beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 512, 522–26.  The 
State argued that, because  the jur y was inst ructed to find that a person “intends” the 
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts but was not provide d with a definition of 
“intends,” the jurors could have interpreted the intentional requirement as referring only to 
the defendant’s “purpose” and  would not ha ve needed to rely upon the tainted  
presumption.  Id. at 525.  Rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned that 
we are not at all certain that a jury would interpret the word “intends” as bearing 
solely upon purpose.  As we stated in [United States Gypsum Co.], “[t]he element 
of intent in the criminal law has traditionally been viewed as a bifurcated concept 
embracing either the specific requirement of purpose or the more ge neral one of 
knowledge or awareness.” 
Id. at 525–26 (q uoting U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 445); see also United States v. 
Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269 , 1274 (4th Cir. 1979)  (“[A] rule focu sing on foreseeable, 
rather than inten ded, consequences operates in sensible and fair fashion to deter  the 
conduct sought to be avoided and to punish those whose actions are blameworthy, even 
though undertaken for purposes that may or may not be culpable.”). 
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In 1987, in Tison v. Arizona,121 the Court discussed the meaning of 
specific intent in the context of whether the deat h penalty was a  
proportional punishment for a felony murder defendant.122  The Court 
stated that “[t]raditionally, ‘one intends certain consequences when he 
desires that his acts cause those consequences or knows that t hose 
consequences are substantially certain to result fro m his acts.’”123  In 
Tison, the Supreme Court decided that the Eighth Amendment did not 
prohibit a state fro m imposing the d eath penalty on a defendant 
convicted of felony murder whose mental state was reck less 
indifference to hum an life.124  The Tison Court addressed whether  
“reckless indifference” proved “speci fic intent to kill,” which was 
required to justify the imposition of the death penalty  under Enmund 
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). The Tison Court stated: 
Enmund held that when “intent to kill” results in its logical though 
not inevitable consequence—the taking of human life—the Eighth 
Amendment permits the State to exact the death penalty after a  
careful weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  
Similarly, we ho ld that the reck less disregard for human life 
implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry 
a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state, a  
mental state that may be ta ken into account in m aking a capital 
sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though 
also not inevitable, lethal result.125 
The majority in Tison used a broader definition of specific intent 
notwithstanding its 1980 decision in United States v. Bailey,126 where 
 
121 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
122 Id. at 149–50. 
123 Id. at 150 (quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT, JR., supra note 80, § 28, at 196). 
124 Id. at 158.  The Court stated that “reckless indifference to the value  of human life 
may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an ‘intent to kill.’”  Id. at 157. 
125 Id. at 157– 58.  Several Justices in Tison, namely Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens, disagreed, stating in a disse nting opinion both that specific intent 
could only be pr oved if the accu sed chose to kill and that anything less was merely  
reckless conduct, which would not merit the death penalty as punish ment.  Id. at 170–71 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (reasoning that a pers on who chooses to act reckless ly and is 
indifferent to the possibility of fatal consequences often deserves serious punishment, but 
because that person has not specifically chosen to kill, the moral and criminal culpability is 
of a different  degree than that of one who killed or intended to ki ll); see also id. at 172  
(“Since I would hold that death may not be inflicted for killings consistent with the Eighth 
Amendment without a finding that the defendant engaged in conduct  with the conscious 
purpose of producing death, these sentences must be set aside.” (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U.S. 586, 628 (1978) (White, J., dissenting))). 
126 444 U.S. 394 (19 80).  In Bailey, the Supreme Cour t decided whether the crime o f 
escape under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) was a general or specific intent crime.  Id. at 408.  In the  
case, the defense both presented evidence that the defendant had escaped from jail to avoid 
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the Supreme Court stated that “‘purpose’ corresponds loosely with the 
common-law concept of specific intent, w hile ‘knowledge’ 
corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent.”127  Thus, the 
BIA’s definition of specific intent, which is limited to only purposeful 
conduct, ignores significant Suprem e Court precedent and a l arge 
body of criminal jurisprudence.128 
C.  The In re J-E- Analysis Focuses on the Torturer, not the Victim 
In In re J- E-, the BIA’s narrow definiti on of specific intent 
established an approach to Article 3  CAT prote ction cases that 
focuses on the intent of  the government official, not  the harm to the 
victim.  The BIA’s holdi ng may have reflected a concern that an  
expansive reading of specific intent in an Article 3 case would later  
impact prosecutions of U.S. law en forcement officials under the 
criminal provisions of the CAT.  Many provisions of the CAT address 
the prevention and prosecution of torture carried out by law  
enforcement,129 which prom pted the United States to include  a 
 
beatings and homosexual attacks and argued that the defendant did not have the spe cific 
intent to avoid c onfinement, as required by the statute.  Id.  The m ajority held that the 
prosecution need only prove gener al intent to convict under the escape statute, which the 
prosecution had accomplished in the case by provi ng that the escap ee knew his actions  
would result in his leaving physical confinement without permission.  Id. at 408–09. 
127 Id. at 405.  The Supreme Court appeared to move away from the tra ditional specific 
intent definition, which previously include d both “purposeful” and  “knowing” co nduct.  
See id.  However, the Bailey Court stated that the line drawn between purpose and 
knowledge was “[p]erhaps the most significant, and most esoteric.”  Id. at 404.  In 1 994, 
the Supreme Court reasoned that “specific intent” means “a purpose to disobey the law” in 
Ratzlaf v. United States.  510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994).  In Ratzlaf, the Supreme Court did not 
elaborate on the varying definitions of sp ecific and general intent in criminal l aw 
jurisprudence.  The Court, interpreting a stat ute that punished willful violations of an 
antistructuring provision, held that “willfulness”  required “both ‘knowledge of  the 
reporting requirement’ and a ‘specific intent to c ommit the cri me,’ i.e., ‘a purpos e to 
disobey the law.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 854–59 
(1st Cir. 1987)); see also United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2 d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 
1984). 
128 See Tison, 481 U.S. at 157; United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 442, 446 
(1978); United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Buffalano, 727 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 
1273 (4th Cir. 1979). 
129 See, e.g., CAT, supra note 6, art. 2, para. 1, at 114 (“Each State Party shall tak e 
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture  in 
any territory under its  jurisdiction.”); id. art. 4, para. 1, at 114 (“Each State Party s hall 
ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. ”); id. art. 9, para. 1, at 
115 (“States Parties shall afford one another the greatest meas ure of assistanc e in 
connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of any of the offences referred to 
in article 4 . . . .”).  However, the history of the CAT indicates the UN General Assembly, 
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specific intent understanding.130  Only Article 3 pertains to protecting 
a victim.  The CAT also was the firs t human rights instru ment to 
define “torture,” although the prohibition of torture appears in several 
treaties and has developed into  a rul e of customary  international 
law.131  However, the drafters of the CAT did not wish this definition 
to be “understood as a def inition in the strict sense of penal law . . .  
[Article 1] gives a description of torture for t he purpose of 
understanding and im plementing the Convention rather than a legal 
definition for direct app lication in cri minal law and cri minal 
procedure.”132  Nonetheless, the United States clearly saw the CAT as 
a codification of the crime of torture and the nation’ s primary concern 
was protecting its troops f rom prosecution.133  This approach to the 
CAT trickled down to the BIA’s in terpretation of Article 3 of the 
treaty in In re J-E-, which effectivel y turned Article 3 protec tion 
hearings into trials of the alleged torturer. 
In a criminal prosecution, the sp ecific intent query focuses on the  
intent of the defendant, not the harm to the victim.134  While this is an 
appropriate analysis for prosecuting torturers, 135 it does not co nsider 
the victim’s viewpoint, which is an essential co mponent of a hu man 
 
when it requested the UN Co ngress to focus on th e issue of torture , sought to develop a 
code of ethics f or law enforc ement agencies in addition to protecting prisoners from 
torture.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 14–15. 
130 See CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 14–15. 
131 See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 10–12. 
132 Id. at 122.  The drafters were concerned that to define torture as “a crime by using an 
open-ended list of purposes might give rise to the objection that this definition would run 
counter to a stric t application of the principle ‘ nullum crimen sine l ege’ (no crime, no  
punishment without a previous law).”  Id. 
133 See CAT Hearing, supra note 57, at 1–4 (statements of Sen. Jesse Helms, Sen. Larry 
Pressler and Ho n. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State) ; id. at 16 
(statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
134 In a “victim-cent ered approach” to criminal law, the victim’s conc erns often aris e 
when determining the punishment for the  crime, not when a court de termines whether the 
defendant had the requisite mens rea to commit the offense.  See, e.g., Stacy Caplow, What 
If There Is No Client?: Prosecutors as “Counselor s” of Crime Victims, 5 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 1, 40 (1998) (“Victims’ voices have been he ard loudest at sentencing, although not 
without controversy.”); Douglas J . Sylvester, Myth in Restorative J ustice History, 2003 
UTAH L. REV. 471, 505–10. 
135 See Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections from 
Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1179, 1228–30 (1994) (arguing that criminal 
law cases approp riately focus on the intent of the defendant becau se “‘only conscious 
wrongdoing constitutes crime’”; whereas tort, antidiscrimination, and refugee law focus on 
providing a remedy for the victim (quoting 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 129 (1981))). 
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rights protection case.136  Previous human rights instruments inspired 
Article 3 of the CAT;137 these instruments both provide a set of rule s 
for the relationship betw een the individual and t he appropriate 
government and contemplate “that this relationship must . . . be based 
upon rights of the individual which entail obligatio ns on the par t of 
the government.”138  For exa mple, the Refugee Convention should  
not be interpreted to be a  criminal prosecution of the persecutor. 139  
Because the rights of the individual are of ut most importance in 
human rights protection,  the inquiry should be: What is the har m to 
the individual?  The question should  not be: Is the government 
official guilty of a crime? 
The BIA also did n ot acknowledge an obvi ous parallel between 
Article 3 protection under the CAT and the Torture Victim Protection 
Act (TVPA) of 1991, 140 an entirely  victim-focused piece of  
legislation that Congress debated and passed during the same ti me 
period it ratified the CAT.141  The TVPA, which allowed victims of 
 
136 See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregiou s in the Everyday: Domestic  
Violence as Torture , 25 C OLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 328 (1994) (concluding that  
focusing on the alleged torturer and the tortious act draws attention away from the victim’s 
suffering); Rebecca B. Schechter, Intentional Starvation as Torture: Exploring the Gray 
Area Between Ill-Treatment and Torture, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1233, 1263 (2003) 
(arguing that a more accurate test f or a court to emp loy to determine the pain or suffering 
requirement is to  objectively measure the extent of the harm endured by the victim).   
Professor Karen Musalo highlighted this problem  in U. S. interpretations of asylum law , 
which she labeled “intent-based,” not “effects-based,” because of the overriding focus on 
the motivation of the persecutor rather th an on the harm to the victim.  Musalo, supra note 
135, at 1181–82.  She stated: 
An intent-based analysis of the phrase ‘on account of’ would require a showing 
that the persecutor was motivated to ha rm the victim because of the victim’s  
status or beliefs.   A n effects-based analysis w ould allow the victim to prevail  
upon a showing that he or she su ffered because of  his or her status or beliefs, 
whether or not he or she could prove the persecutor’s motivation .  The [BIA] . . . 
appeared to adopt an intent-based analysis almost from the outset. 
Id. at 1186 (footnote omitted). 
137 See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 125–26. 
138 Id. at 5. 
139 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has stated that “refugee status examiners 
are not called upon to decide the criminal guilt or liability of the persecutor,  and refugee 
status is not dependent on such proof.”  Br ief for the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 16, INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (No. 90-1342), 1991 WL 11003948. 
140 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). 
141 See id.; see also The Torture Victim Protec tion Act of 1991: Hearings and Marku p 
on H.R. 141 7 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign A ffairs and the Su bcomm. on Human 
Rights and Int’l Orgs., 100th Cong. (1988) [hereinafter TVPA Hearings]. 
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torture, or their repre sentatives residing in the Unite d States, to b ring 
a civil action in federal co urt against the torturer, 142 sought to carr y 
out “obligations of the United States under the U.N. Charter, as well 
as other international agr eements pertaining to  the protection of 
human rights.”143  The TVP A used virtually the same definition of  
torture as the  CAT, y et there w as no s pecific intent require ment.144  
Congress therefore decided, during the sam e time it was ratifying the 
CAT, that victims of torture onl y needed to prove intentio nal 
causation of severe pain or suffering, not “specific int ent.”145  Yet the 
BIA, when it interpreted Article 3, the only victim-based article in the 
CAT, seemingly forgot about vi ctims and focused  on prosecuting 
torturers. 
To demonstrate this prob lem with the BIA’ s approach, a court  
interpreting Jean Etienne’ s case will  focus on the Haitian official s’ 
plans or motives when they detain him.  His likely  level of suffering 
in the Haitian prison will be irrele vant to his CAT protection case.   
Thus, despite the Haitian government’s intentional i mprisonment of 
 
142 TVPA Hearings, supra note 141, at 1 (statement of Rep. Gus Yatron). 
143 Id. 
144 See § 3(b), 106 Stat. at 73–74.  The legislative history of the TVPA indicates that the 
definition of “torture” was intende d to include withholding food or water from prisoners.  
During a hearing on the TVPA, one Congressman stated: 
We know that hunger is often one of the choice weapons used in many of the 
prisons, particularly in the Soviet Un ion and els ewhere, including in Cuba .  
Would that fall in line with the definition [of torture] as stated by the legislation? 
. . . I do raise th at because, again, one of the weapons used most often by the  
forced labor ca mps in the Sovi et Union—and we have, I think, very  good 
documentation on this—is lack of food or lack of water, but it is particularly lack 
of food.  That, coupled with excessive work, causes very deleterious impact upon 
the people, very often leading to d eath.  I would hope that that would be part of 
[the definition of torture]. 
TVPA Hearings, supra note 141, at 74 (statement of Rep. Chris Smith). 
145 See §§ 2–3, 106 Stat. at 73–74.  Under the TVPA torture definition, a government’s  
acts such as starv ing, refusing medications, and providing inadequate toilet facili ties to a 
prisoner can amount to torture; the se acts were held  to be torture wh en committed by the  
Iraqi government.  See Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F . Supp. 2d 19, 22–25 ( D.D.C. 
2001) (interpreting the TVP A definition of torture because it is  incorporated into th e 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which “exempts from immunity foreign 
sovereigns where ‘money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or 
death that was ca used by an act of  torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage 
taking, or the provision of material support or  resources . . . for such an act’” (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2006))); see also Nikbin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 471 F. Supp. 2d 
53, 62–63 (D.D.C. 2007) (interpreting the TVPA definition of torture in a FSIA exemption 
case and stating “[d]etention can itself constitu te torture,” but yet holding that petitioner 
did not suffer torture because h e did not allege that the conditions of confinement caused 
severe pain or suffering). 
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Etienne without food, water, or life-saving medication, he cannot win 
CAT protection solel y by demonstrating that severe pain, suffering, 
and probable death will await him in the Haitian prison. 
D.   BIA’s Specific Intent Definition Is Unworkable in a 
Forward-Looking Context 
Another problem with the BIA’s approach is t hat Article 3 
applicants must prove the  narrow definition of specific intent in a 
prospective case.  Specific intent, as a criminal law concept, is usually 
proved in a criminal prosecution, during which the fact finder has the 
benefit of making inferences based on past conduct. 146  However, “it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to pr ove specific intent i n a 
prospective context.”147  Th e CAT applicant has no tools, such as 
depositions, interrogatories, or cross-examinations at trial, to ask t he 
potential torturer about in tent.148  Rather, adjudicators must make 
predictions about future states of mind; the onl y guidance is a 
regulation that urges immigration ju dges to rely upon t he type of 
information normally used to determ ine intent, such as evidence of 
past torture or other violations of human rights.149  If evidence of past 
conduct is u navailable, an immigr ation judge must consider “‘all 
evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture.’”150 
Jean Etienne, who fears future torture yet has not been subjected to 
past torture, must act as a prosecutor of a future cri me that he claims 
 
146 See Lavira v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 478 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir. 2007); In re J-E-, 23 
I. & N. Dec. 291, 312–13 (B.I.A. 2002) (Rosenberg, dissenting). 
147 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 316 (Rosenberg, dissenting). 
148 Professor Karen Musalo highlig hted this proble m of prospectiv ely proving th e 
motivation of a p ersecution in the asylum context.  See Musalo, supra note 135, at 1202.  
CAT applicants have more of an uphill battle than asylum seekers, however, because CAT 
applicants must prove their government will sp ecifically intend to cause them severe pain 
or suffering, while asylum seeker s must only prove that a protecte d ground is a ce ntral 
reason for the persecution.  Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the 
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 101(a)(3), 
119 Stat. 231, 303; In re J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 211 ( B.I.A. 2007) 
(confirming that noncitizens whose persecutors were motivated by more than one re ason 
will continue to be protected despite the provisions of Public Law Number 109-13). 
149 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) (2009). 
150 Lavira, 478 F.3d at 171 (quoting  8 C.F.R. § 208 .16(c)(3) (2009)).  Article 3 of the  
CAT also states that, for the p urpose of determining whether there are substantial grounds 
for believing the applicant would be in danger of  being subject to to rture, “the competent 
authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, 
the existence in the State concerned of a cons istent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass  
violations of human rights.”  CAT, supra note 6, art. 3, para. 2, at 114. 
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will be co mmitted against him .  While hu man rights reports can be 
useful to prove past acts  by his government, these reports are of  
limited assistance to Etien ne, who must prove that Haitian officials 
will specifically intend t o cause hi m severe p ain or suffering by  
detaining him in atrocious prison conditions.151 
IV 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS TORTURE THE DEFINITION OF SPECIFIC 
INTENT IN CAT PROTECTION CASES 
Because of the specific intent requirement, courts interpreting CAT 
protection have largely focused on crim inal law jurisprudence.152  
There are no reported prosecutions under the crim inal provisions of 
the CAT,153 which are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 340-2340A,154 
despite the addition of the specifi c intent language to clarify  the 
definition of torture for such prosecutions.155  Howe ver, there are  
numerous cases interpreting Article 3 of the CAT, 156 and, as  
 
151 Compounding the problem is the  fact that a pplicants are often rep resented pro s e 
because persons in removal pro ceedings do not have the right to a court-appointed 
attorney.  8 U.S.C. § 1 229a(b)(4)(A) (2006).  In  addition, many CAT applicants are 
subject to mandatory detention because of their criminal offenses, which makes it difficult 
to obtain pro b ono assistance.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006 ).  These factors are 
exacerbated due to the shorter  calendar for these ca ses, which gives a detainee even less  
time to prepare defenses to removal.   See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION 
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 9.1(e), at 121–22 (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm (noting that proceedings for detained noncitizens 
are expedited). 
152 See, e.g., Paul Pierre v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 528 F.3d 180, 189–91 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Franck Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 116–20 (2d Cir. 2007); Lavira, 478 F.3d at 168–
72; Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 139–48 (3d Cir. 2005); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 
463, 473–75 (3d Cir. 2003). 
153 The only reported decision discussing either statute is United States v. Chanthadara, 
in which the U.S. Court of A ppeals for the Tenth Circuit decided that the definition  of 
“torture” under 18 U. S.C. § 2340 did not apply to  the definition of “ torture” used in t he 
jury instructions for death penalty  cases under 18 U.S.C. 3592(c)(6).  United States  v. 
Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1262 (10th Cir. 2000).  The Office of Legal Counsel of the 
DOJ interpreted the specific intent requirement in several memos.  See infra Part V.B. 
154 18 U.S.C. § 2340A makes it a criminal offense for  any person outside of the United 
States to commit  or attempt to commit tor ture. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006).  18 U.S.C. § 
2340 defines an act of torture as “an act committed by a person acting under the c olor of 
law specifically intended to inflict severe physi cal or mental pain or  suffering (other than 
pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or 
physical control.”  18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006). 
155 See CAT Hearing, supra note 57, at 16 (statement of Mark Richard, De puty 
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice); CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 14–15. 
156 See, e.g., Paul Pierre, 528 F.3 d at 189–91; Franck Pierre, 502 F .3d at 116–20; 
Lavira, 478 F.3d at 168–72; Auguste, 395 F.3d at 139–48; Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 473–75. 
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discussed above, courts interpreting Article 3 have  to grapple with 
“specific intent,” an antiquated cri minal law ter m with var ying 
definitions. 
Courts interpreting CAT protection have frequently shifted t he 
focal point: in some ca ses, courts focus entirely on the intent of the 
torturer, but in others courts examine the harm the CAT applicant will 
suffer.  As ill ustrated below, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the T hird 
Circuit has been vacillating between these two focal  points in rec ent 
years.  Each time the court shifted focus, it would revise its definition 
of specific intent.  The reasoning in  these cases, in addition to other 
solutions created by courts, demonstrates courts’ conflicting views of 
whether CAT protection should be in terpreted through the eyes of the 
victim or the torturer. 
A.  The Third Circuit Alternates Viewpoints 
Zubeda v. Ashcroft157 illustrates a victi m-focused analysis of the 
CAT.  In the 2003 Zubeda opinion, the Third Circuit decided the case 
of a woman from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) who  
sought protection under the CAT, fearing that she would be detai ned 
by her government as a deport ee and raped by prison guards.158  The 
court reasoned that the specific intent require ment, as interpreted by  
the BIA in In re J-E- , would “im pose insurmountable obstacles to  
affording the very protections the comm unity of na tions sought to 
guarantee under the Con vention Against Torture.”159  The court 
stated that, “[ a]lthough the regulati ons require that severe pain or 
suffering be ‘intentionally inflicted,’ we do not interpret this as a 
‘specific intent’ requirement.”160  The court reas oned that the 
regulations distinguish suffering that i s the accidental result of  an 
intended act (not torture) fr om suffering that is purposefully  inflicted 
or the foreseeable consequence of deliberate conduct (torture).161  
 
157 Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 463. 
158 The immigration judge had denie d her asylum cla im because of h er inconsistent 
testimony regarding her past perse cution, but the judge granted her relief under the C AT 
because of the likelihood of her  detention in the DRC upon arrival and the p ossibility of 
rape at the hands of the detaining authorities.   Id. at 470 .  T he BIA o verruled the 
immigration judge’s ruling, citing In re J-E-.  Id. at 475. 
159 Id. at 474. 
160 Id. at 473 (internal citation omitted). 
161 Id.  The court examined the specific intent  requirement at 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) 
and noted that this requirement is immediat ely qualified by the phrase “‘[a] n act that  
results in unantic ipated or unintended severity  of pain and suffering is not torture.’”  Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) (2009)). 
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Therefore, the regulations exclude only  pain or suffering that is the 
unintended consequence of an  intentional act from  torture.162  
According to the court’s holding , foreseeable suffering from an 
intentional act would be torture under the CAT.163 
While CAT applicants readily cited the court’s reasoning i n 
Zubeda, the Third Circuit decided, two years later, to look at the CAT 
as a treaty designed only  to prosecute torturers. 164  In the 2005  
Auguste v. Ridge  decision, the Third Circuit denied CAT protection 
for a Haitian  man who feared the prison condi tions that he would 
suffer as a c riminal deportee.165  Reasoning that its s pecific intent 
language in Zubeda was merely dicta,166 the court decided that, “in  
the context of the Convention, for  an act to constitute torture, there 
must be a showing that the actor had t he intent to commit the a ct as 
well as the intent to achieve the conseq uences of the act, namely the 
infliction of the severe p ain and suffering.” 167  The court clearl y 
stated its focus when interpre ting CAT protection: “Augus te’s 
contention that the introduction of cri minal law concepts into the 
standard for relief under the Conventi on was in error because t he 
Convention is not about  criminal prosecution, but rather about 
protecting the victims of torture, is besides the point.”168  Relying on 
one criminal law case and the BIA’ s reasoning in In re J-E- , the 
Auguste court defined specific intent as “expressly intend[ing] to 
achieve the forbidden act.”169 
 
162 Id.; see also DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 465, 
486 (3d ed. 1999) (citing BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 41).  For exampl e, if 
severe pain or suffering is inflicted in the course of a fully justified medical treatment, this 
is not “torture” under the CAT.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 119. 
163 Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 473. 
164 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 145 (3d Cir. 2005). 
165 Id. at 154–55.  When presented with facts more similar to In re J-E- (i.e., an 
applicant who was convicted of a crime, feared return to Haiti, and did not present himself 
as a vulnerable ra pe victim as in Zubeda), it appears that the Third Circuit was willing to 
backpedal from its specific intent reasoning.  See id. at 145–48.  But cf. Zubeda, 333 F.3d 
at 470–74 (detailing the Third Circuit’s specific intent reasoning prior to Auguste). 
166 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 148. 
167 Id. at 145–46. 
168 Id. at 145 (emphasis added). 
169 Id. (citing Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 , 269 (2000)).  In Carter, the Court 
decided whether 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (b), which punished larceny from a bank, was a lesser 
included offense of 18 U.S .C. § 2113(a), which punished robbery from a bank.  Carter, 
530 U.S. at 258–59.  The Court held that the larceny statute section had a specific in tent 
mens rea and the robbery section contained only a general intent mens rea.  Id. at 269–70.  
The petitioner argued that the Court should read in a specific intent mens rea to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2113(b), and t hus, the elements  of the two offe nses would align , making the larc eny 
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The Third Circuit again interpreted the CAT as a victim-centric 
human rights instrument in the 2007 Lavira v. Attorney General of the 
United States opinion.170  Here, the co urt decided the cas e of a  
wheelchair-bound, above-the-knee amputee who suffered from AIDS 
and feared return to the horrendous prison conditions in Haiti that he 
would suffer as a cri minal deportee.171  An expert reported that the 
victim would not receive any  meaningful medical treatment and 
would probably lose thirty pounds shortly after his incarceration, 
which would lead to death.172  The court reasoned that severe pain 
was not a possible consequence that could result from placing him  in 
the facility; it was the only  foreseeable outcome. 173  B ased on this  
record, the Third Circuit  decided that Lavira  had proved specific 
intent and merited CAT protection.174  In Lavira, the court cited  
criminal law for a more generous definition of specific intent that 
would effectuate the goal s of CAT protection and held that specific 
intent could mean “willful blindness.”175 
 
crime a lesser inc luded offense of the robbery crime.  Id. at 270.  Despite this argum ent, 
the Supreme Court held that the presumption in favor of scienter in a statute demands that 
courts only read in a general intent requi rement, not a specific intent requirement.  Id. at 
268.  T he Court cited a nontypical prosecution scenario to demonstrate the difference  
between specific and general inten t.  In this scenario, a person enters a bank and tak es 
money from the teller a t gunpoint, but the viol ator deliberately fails to make a q uick 
getaway “in the hope of being arrested” to return to prison and b e treated for alcoholism.  
Id. (citing United States v. Le wis, 628 F.2d 1276, 1279 (10th Cir. 1980)).  The 
hypothetical criminal knowingly e ngages in the act of using force and taking money, so  
the general inten t requirement is satisfied.  H owever, the criminal  does not intend  to 
permanently deprive the bank of its money, so the requisite specific intent is not met.   Id.  
The dissent note d that a defenda nt exhibiting this kind of “bizarre behavior” wo uld 
probably have specific intent to steal and furthe r noted that this sort of case is an anomaly 
because such indictments are brought no more than once a year.  Id. at 283–84 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis, 628 F.2d at 12 78).  Other tha n citing this nontypical 
scenario, the Su preme Court’s d ecision in Carter has little valu e in determining the  
definition of specific intent. 
170 478 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2007). 
171 Id. at 159.  The applicant’s conviction for purchasing a ten-dollar bag of drugs for an 
undercover agent would classify him as a  criminal deportee dese rving of indefin ite 
detention.  Id. at 159, 170. 
172 Id. at 170–71. 
173 Id. at 170. 
174 Id. at 170–72. 
175 Id. at 171 (citing United States v. Ca minos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985)); see 
also Thelemaque v. Ashcroft, 363 F. Supp. 2d 198, 215 (D. Conn. 2005) (“[A] mechanical 
application of the specific intent requirement might yield results at odds with the language 
and intent of CAT and . . . concepts such as deliberate indifference, reckless disregard or  
willful blindness might well suffice in certain circumstances to satisfy the specific intent 
requirement of the Convention.”). 
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In 2008, an en banc panel of the T hird Circuit ado pted a strictly 
criminal prosecution view of the CAT in Paul Pierre v. Attorn ey 
General of the United States .176  The ap plicant, who suffered fro m 
esophageal dysphagia, feared the Haitian prison conditions, in which 
he could not survive without his mandatory  liquid diet administered 
through a feeding tu be.177  Holding that its reasoning in Lavira was 
merely dicta,178 the court decided to define specific intent as narrowly 
as possible in CAT protection cases.179  The court stated, 
Specific intent requires not simply the general intent to accomplish 
an act with no particular end in mind, but the additional deliberate 
and conscious purpose of accomplishing a specific and prohibited 
result.  Mere knowledge that a resu lt is su bstantially certain to 
follow from one’s actions is not sufficient to form the specific intent 
to torture.180 
Rather, the Third Circuit stated that “[k]nowledge that pain an d 
suffering will be the certain outcome of conduct may be sufficient for 
a finding of general intent but it is not enough for a finding of specific 
intent.”181  The court refuse d to focus on the applicant’ s suffering, 
perhaps because the co urt found t he petitioner unsy mpathetic, 
 
176 528 F.3d 180, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2008). 
177 Id. at 183.  The court stated it was an undis puted fact that Haitian prison official s 
would not be able to provide him with his liquid diet and regular medical attention.  Id. at 
183 n.3.  The court also stated, “ It is not clear from the record h ow long [Paul] Pierre 
would remain imprisoned once returned to Haiti.”  Id. 
178 The Third Circuit explained that, in Lavira, the applicant had demonstrated he 
would be targeted and singled out by the prison guards in Haiti because of his HIV status.  
Id. at 188.  The court characteriz ed its own discussion about willful blindness prov ing 
specific intent in Lavira as mere dicta.  Id.  The concurring opinion in Paul Pierre noted 
that the court’s decision in Lavira, which examined an applicant w hom the maj ority 
agreed had proved all of the elements of a CA T claim, allowed for proof of specific intent 
“in the form of the prison official’s knowle dge that severe pain  and suffering would 
certainly result.”  Id. at 191–92 (Rendell, J., concurring).  Thus, the legal reasoning of the 
Third Circuit’s decision in Paul Pierre did not c omport with its decision to allow any 
portion of the Lavira holding on specific intent to stand.  See id. 
179 See id. at 190 (majority opinion). 
180 Id. at 189. 
181 Id.  In Franck Pierre, the Second Circuit looked at the CAT entirely as a criminal 
prosecution treaty, yet the court left the door open for a broader reading of specific intent 
compared to the BIA’s definition.  Franck Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007). 
Declining to the give “specific int ent” a “counter-intuitive spin,” the court examined the 
various definitions of “specific intent” in CAT protection cases and found a middle ground 
between Lavira and Paul Pierre: the Second Circuit reasoned that specific intent could be  
proved “if it is found on  the record evidence that the actor is a ware of a virtual certa inty 
that such pain and suffering will result.”  Id. at 118 n.6; see also id. at 116–19. 
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referring to his phy sical ailment as “self-imposed.”182  The court 
stated that the lack of m edical care an d likely pain that Paul Pierr e 
would experience was “an unfortunate but unintended consequence of 
the poor conditions in the Haitian prisons, which exist because of  
Haiti’s extreme poverty.  We find that this unintended consequence is 
not the type of proscribed purpose contemplated by the CAT.”183 
Many of the  applicants for CAT relief have been Haitians, like 
Jean Etienne, who fear the severe pain  or suffering that will result 
when they are detained as crim inal deportees in Haiti. 184  Although 
the BIA and circuit courts did not want to open th e floodgates by 
protecting criminal deportees fro m Haiti,185 it became more difficult 
for adjudicators to i magine an app licant returning to Haiti, as they 
were exposed to t he reality of conditions in the Haitian prisons, 
especially when that applicant seemed particularly vulnerable due to a 
medical ailment.186  Also co ntributing to this trend is more thorough 
 
182 Paul Pierre, 528 F.3d at 182.  In Paul Pierre, the Third Circuit was not presented 
with facts as sy mpathetic as the applicant in Lavira, the wheelc hair-bound, double 
amputee, and H IV-positive Haitian CAT applicant w ith a m inor criminal record, or 
Zubeda, the Congolese applicant who feared rape in the prison and had no criminal record.  
See Lavira v. At t’y Gen. of the U.S ., 478 F.3d 158, 170 (3d Ci r. 2007); Zubeda  v. 
Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 467 , 470 (3d Cir. 2003).  The applicant fo r CAT relief in Paul 
Pierre had repeatedly stabbed his ex-girlfriend with a meat c leaver and earn ed a 
conviction for attempted murder that rendered him removable.  Paul Pierre, 528 F.3d at 
183.  His physical ailment, which the Third Circuit called “self-imposed,” resulted from 
his attempt to commit suicide by swallowing battery acid after the stabbing.  Id. at 182–83. 
183 Paul Pierre, 528 F.3d at 189. 
184 These Haitians may only seek r elief from removal under the CAT because  they 
cannot prove persecution “on account of” their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, 
or membership in a particular soc ial group.  Also, deferral of removal under the CAT is 
the only relief fo r which many ar e eligible becaus e their criminal convictions bar t hem 
from seeking asylum or withholding of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006); see 
also supra notes 51–52. 
185 The Third Circuit stated this concern in Paul Pierre: 
To the extent that the majority  fears that such  a holding would open the 
floodgates to CAT petitioners from places such as Haiti where the petitioner will 
likely be subjected to deplorable conditions, there remains an evidentiary burden 
of showing that would-be torturers in such places know of or desire the resulting 
infliction of severe pain and suffering. 
Paul Pierre, 528 F.3d at 195 n.10 (Rendell, J., concurring). 
186 See, e.g., Jean-Pierre v. U.S . Att’y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315, 1318, 1325–26 (11th Cir.  
2007) (remanding the matter to the BIA because a Haitian criminal deportee with mental 
illness presented a different set of facts than the p etitioner in In re J-E- and, therefore, 
required a new CAT protection finding); Lavira, 478 F.3d at 159, 170–71;  cf. F ranck 
Pierre, 502 F.3 d at 121 (rejectin g a CAT claim when evidence s howed either that th e 
applicant’s family in Haiti would likely bring him medicine or that he would be released in 
a timely fashion). 
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human rights documentation of the conditions in Haitian prisons, 187 
which has proved valuab le for convincing adjudi cators that the 
Haitian government knows that severe  pain or suffering will likely  
result for many criminal deportees.188 
B.  Courts Punt Humanitarian Decisions to the Prosecuting Agency 
The cases described above dem onstrate the Third Circuit ’s 
willingness to examine CAT protection through the eyes of the victim 
only when that victim has particularly compelling facts and a m inor 
criminal record.189  In a footnote in Paul Pierre, the Third Circuit  
attempted to find an alternative solution that appeased the consciences 
of all judges deciding these difficult C AT protection cases: if a case 
had compelling humanitarian factors, the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) could grant “deferred action.”190  Deferred 
 
187 Whereas the app licant in In re J-E-  only presente d some proof of the conditions, 
which included a U.S . State Depa rtment report an d a Miami Herald article, applicants 
today call upon the expert testimony of Michelle  Karshan, the director of Alternative  
Chance in Haiti, to give a detailed descripti on of the conditions in the  Haitian prisons.  In 
re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 293 (B.I.A. 2002) ; see also Alternative Chance/Chans 
Alternativ, http://www.alternativechance.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).  Alternativ e 
Chance, which began as a pris oner reentry program for crimin al deportees to H aiti, 
morphed into a human rights documentation or ganization to provide evidence of H aitian 
prison conditions for criminal deportees and advocate on behalf of the deportees.  The 
director of Alternative Chance, Michelle Karshan, regularly testifies as an expert w itness 
in Haitian CAT cases in immigration courts throughout the United St ates.  See In re J-E-, 
23 I. & N. Dec. at 293; see also Jean-Pierre, 500 F.3d at 1319; Lavira, 478 F.3d at 163. 
188 In addition, while the BIA could sa y that the Haitian government was attempting to 
fix the conditions for the deportees, as time has passed and no fix to either the policy or the 
conditions has come,  adjudicators can now  conclude that the H aitian authorities do 
specifically intend to cause severe pain or suffering  to the deportees .  Indeed, one Boston 
immigration judge has decided tha t applicants for CAT protection co uld distinguish In re 
J-E- by the time that had elapsed since the BIA decided the case in 2002.  Because these 
horrible prison c onditions persisted several years l ater, the immigra tion judge reasoned 
that the Haitian government now has the specific intent to cause severe pain or  suffering.  
See In re  E-M- (Boston Immigr. Ct. Dec. 11, 2007) (on file w ith author); In re P-C- 
(Boston Immigr. Ct. Dec. 21, 2006) (on file with author). 
189 Compare Paul Pierre, 528 F.3d at 182–83, 189 (stating specific intent means acting 
with the precise purpose to bring about a desired result; the applicant in this case suffered 
from a “self- imposed” physical ailment resul ting from his fai led attempt at suic ide after 
repeatedly stabbing his girlfri end with a meat cleaver), with Lavira, 478 F.3d at 170 –71 
(stating specific intent can be proved thr ough willful blindness; the applicant was  a 
wheelchair-bound, above-the-knee double am putee, and HI V-positive man who was 
convicted of purchasing one ten-dollar bag of drugs for an undercover agent). 
190 See Paul Pierre, 528 F.3d at 191 n.8 (“Nothing herein prevents the government from 
granting discretionary relief to [Paul] Pierre in the form of deferred action.  Though we are 
bound to the spe cific intent requirement contai ned in the CAT, the government is not.”).  
In Lavira, the DHS had offered deferred action to the applicant if he agreed to withdraw 
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action, which is a for m of prosecutorial discretion, 191 can be granted 
only by the DHS, the prosecuting agency.192  Thus, courts are 
attempting to pass off their responsibili ty under the CAT to protect a 
noncitizen from torture to an agency that may not act sympathetically 
toward many CAT applicants in exerci sing its discretion.193  Unlike 
 
his appeal at the agency level.  Lavira, 478 F.3d at 163 n.6.  Because he refused to do so, 
the Third Circuit did not view this as a realistic option for that applicant.  See id. 
191 To ameliorate a harsh and unj ust outcome, the DH S may decline to institut e 
proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation.  
This exercise in administrative discretion, which is not authorized by statute, origin ally 
was known as “nonpriority” and is now known as “deferred action.”  A noncitizen may be 
granted deferred action at any sta ge of the remov al process.  Granting deferred ac tion 
status means that, for humanitarian reasons,  no action will thereafter be taken to proceed 
against an app arently removable noncitizen.  See 3 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 72.03(2)(h) (rev. ed. 2008).  An Immigration  and 
Naturalization Service memo from 2000 states th at the Agency must look at the following  
factors when con sidering an application for deferred action or prosecutorial discretion: 
immigration status, length of residence in the United States, criminal history, humanitarian 
concerns, immigration history, likelihood of removing the person, likelihood of achieving 
enforcement goal by other means, eligibility for other relief, effect on future admissibility, 
current or past c ooperation with law enforcement authorities, honorable U.S. military 
service, community attention, and resources  available to the agency.  Memorandum from 
Doris Meissner, INS Comm’r, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion to Reg’l Dirs., Dist. 
Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, and Reg’l & Dist. Counsel of INS 7– 8 (Nov. 17, 2000), in 77 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1673, 1679–80 (2000) [hereinafter Meissner Memo]. 
192 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) reads: 
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law 
. . . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of 
any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to 
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any 
alien under this [Act]. 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2006).  In  addition, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) precludes judicial review of 
decisions or actions of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security; the 
authority for this preclusion is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the 
Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.  Courts hav e generally rejected 
challenges to arb itrary refusals to grant deferred a ction.  See, e.g., Romeiro de Silv a v. 
Smith, 773 F.2d 1021, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding the court h ad no jurisdiction to 
review the refusa l to grant deferred action because  the informal administra tive practice 
“creates no protectible liberty inte rest in deferred action, nor does it create a protectible  
interest in being considered for deferred action status”); Velasco-Gutierrez v. Crossland, 
732 F.2d 792, 793–94, 797 (10th Cir. 1984) (“‘[D]eferred action’ or ‘nonpriority’ status is  
essentially an administrative decision by the Service not to deport an otherwise deportable 
alien,” so theref ore, a noncitizen’s interes t in the grant of this relief, in light of the 
“unfettered discretion[,] . . . [is] too remote and i nsubstantial to rise to the level of a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest.”); Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 662 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (holding that, since deferred action practice does not confer a substantive right, 
the court has no authority to review the refusal of a request for deferred action  
consideration in absence of a showing of abuse of discretion). 
193 Many applicants for protection under Article 3 have criminal records that bar  them 
from other forms of relief; this criminal history can be weighed a gainst the humanitarian 
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the DHS, which can wei gh an applicant’ s criminal record agai nst 
humanitarian factors to de termine who merits deferred action, courts 
deciding applications for deferral of rem oval under the CAT must 
consider only the likelihood of torture in the home country.194 
In addition, deferred acti on and othe r types of individualized, 
discretionary relief have proved to  be unworkable in the asy lum 
context.  Before the asy lum law existed as it does toda y,195 people 
requesting protection from  harm would seek parole to enter the 
United States.196  These decisions to grant parole occurred through an 
unstructured, discretionary system with no ju dicial oversight.  This 
method of asking for protection proved to be unworkable for the DHS 
and begged f or legal unif ormity, which prom pted Congress to pass 
the Refugee Act in 1980.197  Similarly, serious problems arise when 
courts request that gove rnment agencies take over the decision 
making regarding protection for victim s of persecution or torture.  In  
regards to the CAT, such courts are punting the decision to the DHS  
and effectively converting a mandatory decision into a discretionary 
one. 
 
factors in their cases when they seek prosecutorial discretion.  See Meissner Memo, supra 
note 191, at 167 9–80; see also id . at 1679 (“There is no precise for mula for identify ing 
which cases warrant a favorable exercise of discretion.”). 
194 While a “particu larly serious crime” is a bar to  asylum, withholding of remova l 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), a nd withholding of removal under the CAT , there is no 
criminal bar to deferral of removal under the CAT.  See supra note 52.  Also, unlike 
asylum, deferral and withholding of removal under the CAT are n ot discretionary.  8  
U.S.C. § 1158(b)  (2006); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1 6(d)(1), 208.17(a) (2009); INS v. Cardo za-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n.5 (1987).  Therefore, a court considering an application for 
deferral of removal under the  CAT may not deny the claim base d on the  applicant’s 
criminal record.  8 C.F.R. § 208.17. 
195 Today, asylum laws and regulations are codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 and 8 C.F.R. §§ 
208.1 to 208.15. 
196 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 427 n.4.  There were a few predecessors to the 
asylum and withholding of rem oval statutes, bu t these statutes were either entirely  
discretionary or allowed protection only to certain persons, i.e., those fleeing a communist-
dominated country.  See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 50, at 847–48. 
197 Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study 
on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 438–39 (1992) (explaining that the Refugee Act was 
enacted to achieve uniform, fair, and impartial a sylum procedures).  The 1980 Refu gee 
Act added 8 U.S .C. § 1158 establishing asylum status, which is discretionary.  The Act 
also amended the nonrefoulement section of the Immigration and N ationality Act, then 8 
U.S.C. § 1253(h), to make its provisions mandatory.  ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 50, at 
847–49. 
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V 
A BETTER CHOICE: “FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES” DEFINITION OF 
SPECIFIC INTENT 
A more generous defin ition of specific intent would allow 
adjudicators to focus on the likely  harm to the vict im; as such, this 
definition would better effectuate the history and purpose of 
protection under Article 3 of the CAT.  Under this definition, specific 
intent means “knowing the act would likely result in severe pain or 
suffering.”  This meaning finds am ple support in crim inal law 
jurisprudence; it has al so been proposed by  the Office of L egal 
Counsel (OLC) of the DOJ in its in terpretation of the cri minal 
provisions of the CAT. 
A.  The Purpose and Legislative History of Article 3 Protection 
The “hair-splitting”198 of deciding the meaning of specific intent in 
CAT protection cases co mes down to a life-or-death situation for 
most applicants.  One scholar has co mmented that proof of inte nt in 
the area of criminal law has been modified to protect perceived 
societal interests.199  Courts  are willing to apply a “result-oriented 
construction of the statute’s mental req uirement”200 in cri minal law 
cases to avoid prosecution for a parti cularly compelling defendant or 
ensure prosecution for a particularly detestable defendant.201  Courts 
also may be willing to i nterpret a statu te to contain a mens rea of 
general intent, as oppo sed to specific intent, to preclude an 
intoxication defense.202  The proverbial hair should be split in favo r 
of Article 3 applicants, for whom  there is a societal interest 203 in 
 
198 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 407 (1980). 
199 Musalo, supra note 135, at 1229. 
200 Batey, supra note 71, at 348. 
201 See id. at 386. 
202 The Connecticut Supreme Court sought to prevent an intoxication defense for rape 
by holding that it was a general intent crime.  See State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713 , 716 
(Conn. 1989).  T he court stated : “The difficulty of convicting a thoroughly intoxicated 
person of rape, if awareness of l ack of c onsent were an element  of the crime, would 
diminish the protection that our statutes pres ently afford to potential victims from lus tful 
drunkards.”  Id. 
203 The CAT proposed to “make more effective the s truggle against to rture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world.”  CAT, supra 
note 6, preambl e, at 113; see also CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 3 (discus sing 
Congress’s passage of a joint resolution in 1984 that both reaffirmed the federal 
government’s opposition to torture and its commi tment to combat the practice of tor ture 
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protection from enduring severe pain or suffering at the hands of a 
foreign government.204 
Moreover, the ter m “specific intent” is so m alleable that a m ore 
expansive definition can  be suppor ted with ample crim inal law 
jurisprudence.205  Defining specific intent to include b oth purposeful 
and knowing acts is not contrar y to the legislative will, as Presidents 
Reagan and Bush and the Senate did not follow the Model Penal Code 
approach to defining the mens rea of torture in the CAT, which would  
have given courts more direction.206  The Senate instead ratified th e 
CAT with an understanding  that included a specific intent 
requirement, despite years of criminal law jurisprudence that showed 
the varying possible definitions of the term.207 
The adoption of the specific intent requirement as an 
understanding, not a reser vation, is significant.  Reservations alter a 
country’s treaty obligations; whereas understandings contain the 
Senate’s interpretation of certain provisions.208  As the Third Circuit 
stated: “This suggests to us that the commonly understood meaning at 
the time of ratification was that, at least to the United States, the 
specific intent standard was consistent with a reasonable  
 
and expressed support for the i nvolvement of t he government in the formulation of 
international standards and effective implementing mechanisms against torture). 
204 Professor Musalo argued that as ylum seekers sh ould also get th e benefit of the  
“perceived societal interest” in protecting them from persecution.  See Musalo, supra note 
135, at 1228–39. 
205 See cases cited supra Parts II.A and III.B. 
206 At the same time Presidents Reag an and Bush sub mitted the unders tandings to the 
CAT and the Senate adopted such understandings, the Model Penal Code had been enacted 
to clarify the mur ky waters of specific and general intent.   See Méndez, supra note 79, at 
430 (“A solution to the confusion the common-law terms have created is to adopt the mens 
rea terms concei ved by the A merican Law Institute.”).  Moreover, at the time  that t he 
Senate adopted the understanding s and Congress passed the F ARRA, the definition of 
“specific intent” had been interpreted to incl ude “knowingly” and not just “purposefully.”  
See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
438 U.S. 422 , 446 (1978); United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1 386, 1393 (11th Cir.  
1984); United States v. Buffalano, 727 F.2 d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.  
Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273 (4th Cir. 1979). 
207 See cases cited supra Parts II.A and III.B. 
208 See LIESBETH LIJNZAAD, RESERVATIONS TO UN-HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: 
RATIFY AND RUIN? 60 (1995) (describing interpretations such as U.S. understandings as a 
“transition from the text of a treaty to treat y practice”); Curtis A. Bradley & Ja ck L. 
Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 
429–30 (2000) (analogizing reservations to “counteroffers” in a bilateral treaty and stating 
the traditional rule in bilateral treaties that the reserving state generally is not a party to the 
treaty unless every other party agrees to the reservation). 
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interpretation of the language in Article 1.”209  The Senate could have 
determined that the specific intent  standard would include more than 
purposeful conduct,210 as this definition is consistent with the one 
used by many criminal courts.211  It is also consistent with “a 
reasonable interpretation of the language in Article 1 ,”212 as no other 
country limits the definition of torture to only purposeful conduct.213 
B.  The Justice Department’s Definition of Specific Intent 
The DOJ also relied on a more expansive definition of specific 
intent in the context of whether U.S. interrogators should be punish ed 
under the CAT for their treat ment of detainees.214  Initially, the OL C 
had a very  narrow reading of the specific intent element of torture, 
 
209 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 143 n.20 (3d Cir. 2005). 
210 It is a well-settled principle that Congress is presumed to be aware of existing ca se 
law when it legi slates.  See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 212 (1993) 
(noting the “presumption that Congress was awar e of [prior] judicial interpretations [of a  
statute] and, in effect, adopted them”); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) 
(“‘[W]e do not lightly assume that Congre ss has intended to de part from establis hed 
principles’” created through judicial decisi ons. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barc elo, 
456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982))); Miles  v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (“We 
assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.”). 
211 See cases cited supra note 206. 
212 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 143 n.20. 
213 See BOULESBAA, supra note 33, a t 20 (discussing that all countries  other than the 
United States advocated for a definition of “t orture” that included acts that are committ ed 
with “general intent,” which can include grossly negligent acts) ; BURGERS & DANELIUS, 
supra note 24, at 118 (“According to the definition in article 1, torture must be an  
intentional act.  I t follows that where pain or suffering is the result of an accident or of 
mere negligence, the criteria for r egarding the act as torture are not fulfilled. ”); Copelon, 
supra note 136, at 326 (“The intent required under the international torture conventions is 
simply the general intent to do the act wh ich clearly or foreseeably causes ter rible 
suffering.”).  In 2002, when the OLC was asked to interpret the criminal provisions of the  
CAT, the OLC erroneously concluded that a ll other countries advocated for a specific  
intent requirement in the definition of torture.  See Memorandum from Jay S. By bee, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–
2340A to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 15 n.7 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter 
Bybee Memo], available at http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/bybee80102mem 
.pdf.  But see BOULESBAA, supra note 33, at 20 (“The U.S. was the only country that was 
not satisfied with the term ‘intenti onally.’  No other State commented on it; it invited  no 
serious discussion from the Work ing Group and the U.S.’s proposal was not ad opted.”).  
In the same footnote in the Bybee Memo, the OLC stated that even if  a narrow reading of 
the “specific intent” requirement was not consistent with the Article 1 definition of torture, 
“the [specific intent] understanding represents a modification of the o bligation undertaken 
by the United States.”  See Bybee Memo, supra, at 15 n.7.  But see supra note 208 and  
accompanying text (describing that reservations, not understandings, alter a  country’s 
treaty obligations). 
214 See Levin Memo, supra note 22. 
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which was si milar to the BIA’s definition in In re J-E- .215  In an 
“infamous” 2002 memo, the OLC gav e Central Intelligence Agen cy 
(CIA) operatives a definition of  torture under 1 8 U.S.C. § 2 340216 
that allowed the agents to use harsh interrogation techniques without 
subjecting them to prosecution for torture. 217  Regarding torture, this 
2002 memo concluded that “even if th e defendant knows that severe 
pain will result from  his actions, if causing such harm  is not his 
objective, he lacks the requisite sp ecific intent e ven though the 
defendant did not act in good faith.”218 
In its December 30, 2004, memo on U.S. torture policy, which 
superseded the 2002 m emo in its entire ty,219 the Justice Department 
 
215 See Bybee Memo, supra note 213, at 3– 5.  For a discussion of how the Bush 
administration’s narrow definition of “tortur e” had a collateral effect on CAT applica nts, 
see Renee C. Redman, Defining “Torture”: The Collateral Effec t on Immigration Law of 
the Attorney General’s Narrow Interpretation of “Specifically Intended” when Applied to 
United States Interrogators, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 465 (2007). 
216 18 U.S.C. § 2340A makes it a criminal offense for  any person outside of the United 
States to comm it or attemp t to co mmit torture.  1 8 U.S.C. § 2340 (1) defines an ac t of 
torture as “an a ct committed by a person acting  under the color  of law specific ally 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering 
incident to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control.” 
217 See generally Bybee Memo, supra note 213; Harold Hongju Koh, A World Without 
Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 641, 645–46 (2005).  In April 2009, Presid ent 
Obama released four additional OLC memos concerning U.S. interrogation techniques in 
response to a Freedom of Information Act request.  Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Memos 
Spell Out Brutal C.I.A. Mode of Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at A1.  One of 
the memos, also written by Jay Bybee in 2002 , applies his narrow definition of tort ure to 
authorize specific interrogation tactics that were used against al Qaeda operative Abu 
Zubaydah.  See generally Memorandum from Jay  S. Bybe e, Assistant Att’y Gen ., on 
Interrogation of al Qaeda Ope rative to John Rizzo, Acting Gen . Counsel, Cent. 
Intelligence Agency (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2009/images/ 
05/22/bybee.pdf. 
218 Bybee Memo, supra note 213, at 4.   D ean Koh criticized the B ybee Memo a s 
“perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read.” Koh, supra note 217, 
at 647.  He cited “five obvious failures” of  the Bybee Memo, which are: (1) the opinion 
fails to mention the legal and hist orical context in which the memo w as written; (2) the 
opinion defines “torture” so narrowly that the word’s meaning is lost and even Sad dam 
Hussein’s security forces’ techniques w ould not constitute tortu re; (3) the opinion  
misinterprets the power of the President under the Commander-in-Chief power in Article  
II of the Constitution by suggesting that, through this power, the President can sanct ion 
torture and Con gress has no power to interfere; (4) the opinion  suggests that lower  
executive officials can escape prosecution for illegal torture by clai ming that they w ere 
“just following orders”; and (5) the opinion s uggests that the CAT allows cruel, inhum an, 
or degrading treatment as permissible U.S. government interrogation tactics.  Id. at 647–
53. 
219 Dean Koh discussed the repudiation of the 2002 memo: 
 After being leaked to the press shortly after the revelation of atrociti es at Abu 
Ghraib, the B ybee Opinion sparked a fire storm of criticis m.  A fter months of 
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redefined the specific intent ele ment of torture, citing Wa yne R. 
LaFave’s Substantive Criminal Law .220  The 2004  memo stated that 
the specific intent element would be met if the defendant performed  
an act and “consciously  desires” that act to inflict severe phy sical or 
mental pain or suffering.221  The memo recognized that a mens rea of 
knowledge could also suffice to prove specific intent: 
[I]f an individual acted in good faith, and only after reason able 
investigation establishing that his conduct would not inflict severe 
physical or m ental pain or suffering, it appears unlikely that he 
would have the specific intent necessary to violate sections 2340-
2340A.  S uch an i ndividual could be said neither consciously to 
desire the proscribed result, see, e.g., Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405, nor to 
have ‘knowledge or notice’ that his act ‘would likely have resulted 
in’ the proscribed outcome, Neiswender, 590 F.2d at 1273.222 
If the DOJ is willing to expose U.S. interrogat ors to easier 
prosecution for torture by broadly  defining specific intent, then it is 
absurd that those seeking protection under the CAT must use a 
narrower definition to prove that th e acts they fear are “torture.”223  
The DOJ found sufficient ambiguity in the legislative history of the 
CAT to interpret the specific inte nt requirement according to the 
common law definition, 224 thus renderin g more criminal defendant s 
 
public debate, it was finally rescinded on December 30, 2004, less than a week 
before its addressee, Alberto Gonzales, ap peared before the S enate for his 
confirmation hearings as Attorney General of the United States. 
Id. at 646.  “Almost as soon as the Bybee Opinion made it to th e front page of [the]  New 
York Times, the Administration repudiated it, demonstrating how obviously wrong the  
opinion was.”  Id. at 655. 
220 Levin Memo, supra note 22. 
221 Id. (quoting LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 5.2(a), at 341). 
222 Id.  Of the four memos released by President Oba ma in April 2009, three memos,  
written in 2005,  assured the CIA that it s interrogation techniques were stil l legal, even 
when multiple methods were com bined.  Mazzetti & Shane,  supra note 217, at A1.  The 
2005 memos did not alter the def inition of specific intent cited in the 2004 Levin Me mo.  
See, e.g., Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
on Application of 18 U.S .C. §§ 2340–2340A to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in 
the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. 
Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency, 29–30 (May 10,  2005), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/olc_memos.html; Levin Memo, supra note 22. 
223 See Redman, supra note 215, at 489–91; see also Franck Pierre v. Gonzales , 502 
F.3d 109, 120 (2d Cir. 20 07) (“It is unseemly for a governmen t to adopt different 
meanings of the same word in the same treaty; and it is imprudent for a court to fix on a 
special or unnatural meaning in  litigation wh en the political branches are evidently  
disposed otherwise.”). 
224 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 73, § 10 .04, at 130 (“At common  law, a perso n 
‘intentionally’ causes the social harm of an offense if: (1) it is his desire (i.e., his conscious 
object) to cause the social harm; or (2) he acts with knowledge that the socia l harm is  
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guilty of t orture.  Assuming such a mbiguity exists, the use of a 
narrower definition of specific intent in civil imm igration cases as 
compared to criminal cases flies in the face of the rule of lenity.225 
VI 
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND CONCERNS 
One solution I propose is for Attorn ey General Holder to issue a 
new precedential decision modifying the BIA’s definition of specific 
intent in In re J-E-.  An alternative solution is for courts to adopt the 
“foreseeable consequences” de finition of specifi c intent, 
notwithstanding In re J-E-.  Both of these solutions present their own 
problems, however, which are discussed below. 
A.  Policy Concerns for the Attorney General to Overrule In re J-E- 
As the agency  entrusted with the adjudication of C AT protection 
cases, the DOJ may change its official position on its interpretation of 
the definition of torture. 226  As discuss ed in Part V, a “foresee able 
consequences” definition in th ese cases would unify the D OJ’s 
interpretation of the specific inte nt standard of th e CAT in b oth 
 
virtually certain to occur as a resu lt of his conduct.” (footnote omitted)); L AFAVE, supra 
note 13, § 5.2 , at 340 (“Intent has traditiona lly been defined to include knowled ge, and 
thus it is usually said that one intends certain consequences when he desires that his acts 
cause those c onsequences or knows that those consequences are substantially certain to 
result from his acts.”). 
225 The rule of lenit y requires that c ourts interpret ambiguous statutes in a mann er 
favorable to a criminal defendant.  It is a principle of law that only applies to ambiguous 
statutes because a clear intention from the legislature overrides a court’s preference for  
what types of of fenses should be punished under the crimina l statute.  See DRESSLER, 
supra note 73, § 5.04, at 50–51. 
226 Indeed, in the waning days of the Bush administration, Attorney Ge neral Mukasey 
issued two precedent decisions that overruled longstanding BIA pre cedent in immigration 
law.  See In re Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2009) (holding that there is 
no Fifth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in immigration procee dings 
and, thus, no right to file a mo tion to reopen base d on such ineffec tive assistance); In re 
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 699–704 (Op. Att’y Gen . 2008) (holding that the 
“categorical inquiry,” which requires adjudicators to examine only the elements of a cr ime 
and the record of conviction to determine whether a noncitizen is rem ovable for a criminal 
conviction, is not always the proper method for determining whether an offense inv olves 
moral turpitude); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (“‘An initial  agency interpretation is not instantly carved in st one.  
On the contrary, the agency .  . . must consider vary ing interpretations and the w isdom of 
its policy on a continuing basis,’ . . . for exam ple, in response to changed factual 
circumstances, or a change in administra tions . . . .” ( quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc . v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 46 7 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984) (internal citations omitted) 
(first alteration in original)). 
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criminal prosecution and protection cases.  It woul d also unite the 
United States with our world allies 227 because all countries would 
present a uni fied definition of “torture.” 228  In 2002, when the BIA 
decided In re J-E-, it was the earl y stages of interpreting the 
Convention.229  With the benefit of the 2004 OLC mem o230 and 
guidance from circuit courts’ interpre tations of specific intent, 231 
Attorney General Holder can take another look at the definition of 
torture. 
However, the BIA’s hol ding in In re J -E- implicitly reflects th e 
congressional intent t o limit Article 3 protection so that crim inals 
would not be  eligible for  this relief from  removal.232  The decision 
also reflects a broader “fl oodgates” concern, one that had rear ed its 
head in as ylum cases before CAT protection was a vailable.233  The 
applicant’s facts in In re J-E- present a practical quandary: if Haitian 
prison conditions “torture” and the evidence clearly demonstrates that 
criminal deportees are more likely than not to be detained in these 
 
227 See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Inaug ural Address (Jan. 20, 200 9), 
reprinted in The Address: “All This We Will Do,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at P2 (“And 
so, to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the  grandest 
capitals to the small village where my father  was born, know that America is a  friend of 
each nation, and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity.”). 
228 See BOULESBAA, supra note 33, at 20. 
229 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 309 (B.I.A. 2002) (Schmidt, dissenting). 
230 See supra Part V.B. 
231 See supra Part IV.A. 
232 FARRA § 2242(c) states: 
To the maximum extent consistent w ith the obligations of the United States  
under the Convention, subject to any reservations, understandings, declarations, 
and provisos contained in the United States Senate  resolution of ratification of 
the Convention, the regulations . . . shall exclude from the protec tion of such 
regulations aliens described in . . . 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B) . . . . 
FARRA, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. XXII, § 2242(c), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–822; 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(B) (2006) (listing conviction of pa rticularly serious crime, persecution of 
others, commission of serious no npolitical crime before arrival in the U nited States, 
danger to the security of the U nited States); see also In re J-E- , 23 I. & N. Dec. at 311 
(Rosenberg, dissenting) (“It is  no secret that Congress was not pleased with being 
obligated to extend protection to persons, including those with criminal convictions, who  
are barred from eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal.”). 
233 See, e.g., Fatin v . INS, 12 F.3d 1 233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (“If  persecution were 
defined that expansively, a significant percentage of the world’s population would qualify 
for asylum in this country—and it seems mos t unlikely that Congress intended such a  
result.”); In re H-, 21 I. & N.  Dec. 337, 350 (B.I.A. 1996) (Heilman, dissenting) (“Indeed, 
if one pursues the majority’s logic, all warring sides persecute one another, and this means 
that all civil wars  are nothing mor e than acts of persecution.  The implications of such a 
sweeping conception of ‘persecution’ should give us all pause.”). 
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conditions, then would this  ruling encourage Haitians to come to the 
United States, commit crimes, then demand protection?234  And what 
about all of  the lawful, perm anent resident Haitians, now facing  
removal for an aggravated felony, who Congress deemed unworthy of 
a second chance? 235  Would  Article 3 protection become their back 
door to staying in the United States? 
Despite these floodgate concerns, a broader definition of specific 
intent will not provide relief to a ll Haitian cri minal deportees.  For  
example, Haitians who do not su ffer from a life-threatening illness 
may not be able to pr ove that their pain and suffering is severe 
enough to merit CAT protection. 236  In a ddition, criminal deportees 
who can secure timely release from prison in Haiti may not be able to 
prove that they  are more likely than not to endur e severe pain or 
suffering.237 
B.  Chevron Deference to the BIA’s Definition of Specific Intent 
If courts begin to adopt a uniform, broad reading of specific intent 
in CAT protection cas es, they face the doctrine of Chevron 
deference.238  A general principle of ad ministrative law is that on ce 
an agency has interpreted the statute it was entrusted to administer, it 
is unlikely that a feder al court will second-guess the agen cy’s 
 
234 See Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 396 (1st Cir. 2004) (refusing to recognize “ a 
‘social group’ consisting of deported Haitian nationals with criminal records in the United 
States” out of concern that these H aitians could commit crimes in the United States, “thus 
immunizing them from deportation”). 
235 In 1997, Congress eliminated the waiver of deportation that previously was available 
to long-term permanent U.S . residents who  had been convicted of an aggravated felony 
and replaced th e waiver with cancellation of removal; noncitizens who  have been 
convicted of an  aggravated felony are barred  from cancellation of removal.  See Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility  Act of 1 996 (IIRAIRA), Pub. L. No. 
104-208, div. C, tit. III, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–587. 
236 In In re J-E- , the BIA discussed t he meaning of  “severe pain or  suffering” in the  
definition of torture and concluded that certain acts of police bruta lity were not “torture.”   
In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 295–98. 
237 The most recent U.S. Department of State report on human rights conditions in Haiti 
states: “Because of lack of av ailable space in  prisons and detention centers, the  
government made efforts to relea se the deportees quickly.”  B UREAU OF DEMOCRACY, 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: HAITI (2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119163.htm; see also In re M-B-A-, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 474, 477–80 (B.I.A. 2002) (holding that a Nigerian woman who feared torture in a 
Nigerian prison as a criminal deportee could not prove that the feared detention was more 
likely than not to happen to her). 
238 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natur al Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 
(1984). 
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interpretation.239  Under this principle, co mmonly known as 
“Chevron deference,” a reviewing c ourt must determine whether 
Congress clearly answered the question at issue in the statut ory 
language.240  If Congress was clear, the reviewing court follows the  
language of the statute without deference to the agency .241  If 
Congress was am biguous in the statutor y language, the court will  
defer to the agency’s inte rpretation so long as the  interpretation is 
reasonable.242  Co mmentators have suggested that if a reviewin g 
court finds the statute to be am biguous, the court ro utinely defers to 
the agency.243 
In the cont ext of immigration law, Chevron deference is 
particularly rampant.  Courts repeatedly quote the Supreme Court’s 
1999 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre decision244: “judicial deference to the 
Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context 
where officials ‘exercise especially  sensitive political functions t hat 
implicate questions of  foreign relations.’” 245  The notion that 
“[i]mmigration has been a part of our foreign relations, and foreign 
relations has been the rese rve of the political branch es”246 explains 
 
239 Id. at 844.  An agency must promulgate the in terpretation in the exercise of it s 
congressional authority in order to merit Chevron deference.  See United States v. M ead 
Corp., 533 U.S . 218, 226–27 (2 001).  Thus, an  improper proce ss, such as failing to  
propose a regula tion and provide  a notice-and-co mment period, may cause a  court to 
refuse deference to the agency’s interpretation.  See id. 
240 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
241 Id. at 842–43. 
242 Id. at 843–44. 
243 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE 
L.J. 969, 977 (1992) (“Under Chevron, the court must initially establish whether the issue 
is suitable for independent judicial resolution; if it is not, the court automatically shifts into 
a deferential mode.  As a result, independent judgment now requires special justification, 
and deference is the default rule.”). 
244 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
245 Id. at 425 (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)); see also, e.g., Villegas 
v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2008). 
246 Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 340 
(2002).  In The Chinese Exclusion Case in 1889, the Supreme Court explained the plenary 
power doctrine: 
The power of exclusion of fore igners being an incident of sovereignty belonging 
to the governme nt of the United  States as a part  of those sovere ign powers 
delegated by the constitution, the right to its exerci se at any time when,  in the  
judgment of the government, the interests of the c ountry require it,  cannot be  
granted away or restrained on behalf of any one. 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).  
For a general discussion of the executive br anch’s plenary power over immigration la w, 
see DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
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the executive branch’s “plenary power” over immigration law and the 
extreme deference given to the agency in immigration cases.247  In its 
interpretation of the CAT,  an internati onal treaty adopted i nto U.S. 
law, courts have given deference to the BIA because it is an executive 
agency interpreting U.S. treaty obligations.248 
C.  Deference to the BIA’s Interpretation of Criminal Law 
Chevron deference is only appropriate when courts are considering 
a statutory scheme that t he agency is entrusted to ad minister.249  
Unlike a reviewing court, the agency has a “full understanding of the 
force of the statutor y policy in the given situation”250 and “[‘]a body 
of experience and informed judgm ent to which courts and litigants 
 
(2007); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Me aning and Impact of 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365 (2002); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal 
Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 862 (1989). 
247 See KANSTROOM, supra note 246, at 15–20. 
248 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F .3d 123, 140 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Franck Pierre v . 
Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 117 (2d Cir. 2007) (providing citations to supportive cases); cf. El 
Al Isr. Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tsen g, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) (“Respect is ordinarily due 
the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an international  
treaty.”); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989).  Professor Curtis Bra dley 
examined why courts have given Chevron-style deference to the executive branch.  Curtis 
A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 V A. L. REV. 649, 6 64 (2000).  
Professor Bradley explained justifications for this deference, which include the following: 
(1) unlike domestic law, where power is shared among the three branches of government, 
the executive branch is the sole pl ayer in foreign affairs and thus req uires flexibility; (2) 
decisions in foreign affairs are more political than legal in nature; and (3) the executive 
branch has much greater expertise and access to inf ormation than courts.  Id.  Critiques of 
such deference i nclude: (1) the d istinction between foreign and d omestic affairs is no t 
always clear and has eroded in rec ent years, (2) the executive branch is not the sole player 
in foreign affairs because the Constitution assigns responsibilities for foreign affairs to all 
three branches of  government, (3) the need fo r flexibility in foreign affairs is no greater 
than in complex domestic matte rs, and (4) it i s not clear to what extent j udicial 
enforcement will actually impede the ability of the United States to act effectively i n 
international relations.  Id.; see also id. at 703 (citing Perkins v . Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 335–
42, 344–49 (1939)) (comparing treaty resolution to Chevron analysis because cou rts 
interpreting treaties must determine whethe r the plain language o f the treaty clearly 
resolves the issue).  Some courts h ave questioned the amount of defe rence that should be 
given to the BIA’s interpretation of the CAT, which has application outside of the cont ext 
of immigration.  See Franck Pierre, 502 F.3d at 113–14; Sumitomo Sho ji Am., Inc. v. 
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982) (“ Although not c onclusive, the mean ing 
attributed to treaty provisions  by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation 
and enforcement is entitled to great weight.” (emphasis added)). 
249 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
250 Id. (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382–83 (1961)). 
 2009] Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing of Victim Protection 825 
may properly resort for guidance.’”251  However, courts may interpret 
terms that, while the y appear in an  agency’s statute, do not require 
specialized knowledge to interpret.  For exam ple, in the 2001 Francis 
v. Reno opinion,252 the Third Circuit decided that the BIA dese rved 
no deference when interpreting whether a co nviction was an  
“aggravated felony,” which was defined as a crime of violence under 
18 U.S.C. § 16. 253  Despite the inclusion of 18 U.S.C . § 16 in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which the BIA is entrusted to 
administer, the Third Circuit decided that a federal co urt was equally 
equipped to interpret whether an offense w as a crime of violence  
under this federal criminal statute.254 
In the imm igration law context, several courts have held that the 
BIA receives Chevron deference when it is interpreting the INA, but  
not when it is  interpreting state or federal criminal laws.255  The BIA 
routinely interprets criminal statutes because there are myriad grounds 
for removal that are based  upon a criminal convicti on.256  When an  
immigration adjudicator is presented with a crim inal conviction, t he 
categorical approach established by the Supre me Court in Taylor v. 
United States257 is used to determ ine whether that conviction renders 
the noncitizen rem ovable.  Under the categorical approach, an 
adjudicator must examine only the ele ments of the cri minal statute 
and the m inimum conduct necessary  for a convi ction under the  
statute.  If these match the ground for removal, the inquiry ends there, 
and the adj udicator does not consider the f acts that led to  the 
 
251 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 
524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998)). 
252 Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2001). 
253 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006). 
254 See Francis, 269 F.3d at 168; see also Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 203–04 (2d 
Cir. 2001). 
255 Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 2005); Michel v. INS , 206 F.3d 
253, 262 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W] here the BIA is interpreting § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA, 
Chevron deference is warranted, but where the BIA is interpreting state or federal criminal 
laws, we must review its decision de novo.”); see also Hamdan v. INS, 98 F .3d 183, 185 
(5th Cir. 1996).  But see Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 1994). 
256 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2) (2006). 
257 Taylor v. United States, 49 5 U.S. 575 (1990).  The Taylor decision addressed 
whether a state b urglary conviction was a predicate burglary offens e under 18 U.S .C. § 
924(e), which would enhance the defendant’s sentence.  Id. at 602.  Recently, Attorney 
General Mukasey decided that the BIA should abandon the Taylor method for determining 
whether a respondent was convict ed of a crime involving moral tu rpitude.  In re Silva-
Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 699–704 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008). 
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conviction.258  Courts have held that when the BIA is engaged in th is 
sort of examination of the ele ments of a criminal statute, the agency 
does not deserve any  deference be cause courts can and often do 
interpret the elements of a criminal statute.259 
In the CAT  context, t he BIA is interpreting specific intent, a  
criminal law concept, not an i mmigration law ter m such as 
“refugee.”260  Specific intent is not an ob scure regulatory concept in 
which courts have no expertise; as st ated by the Third Circuit, “[t]he 
specific intent standard is a term o f art that is well-known in  
American jurisprudence.”261  For this  reason, courts do n ot 
necessarily owe deference to the BIA’s interpretation of this criminal 
law term.262 
CONCLUSION 
The United States cares about eliminating torture worldwide and 
protecting individuals from torture, as demonstrated by its seven years 
of negotiations of the CAT.  The U.S. ratification of the CAT  and 
 
258 Immigration adjudicators may also engage in a “modified categorical  approach” if  
the statute, for example, contains some elements included in the  ground of removability 
and others that ar e not included.  In this instance, the adjudicator is permitted to examine 
the record of c onviction, which includes the charging document, plea, verdict, and  
sentence.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c )(3)(B) (2006); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 
20–23 (2005) (holding that police reports are not included in the record of conviction in a 
sentencing case); In re Teixeira, 21 I. & N. Dec. 316,  319 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that 
police reports are not included in the record of conviction in an im migration case).  The 
BIA has also advocated for the us e of the categoric al approach for policy reasons, as this 
approach prevents adj udicators from using hearing time to “retry” the underlying  
conviction.  See In re Pichardo, 21 I. & N. Dec. 330, 335–36 (B.I.A. 1996); see also 
Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 4 5, 56 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[B]ecause the BIA may not 
adjudicate guilt or mete out criminal punishment,  it must base removal orders  on 
convictions, not on conduct alone.”). 
259 See, e.g., Michel, 206 F.3d at 262. 
260 Cf. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1164, 1167 (2009) (reasoning that whether a 
person is a “pers ecutor of others”  under the INA is an ambiguous s tatutory concept that 
merits Chevron deference and remanding the cas e to the BIA to interpret the stat utory 
meaning); Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 2004). 
261 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 145 (3d Cir. 2005 ).  Despite the large volume of 
case law defining specific in tent in American jurisprudence, the BIA cited not a s ingle 
criminal law case in the In re J-E- opinion and only cited Black’s Law Dictionary  for its 
“specific intent” definition.  In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (B.I.A. 2002). 
262 One scholar suggests that the U.S. De partment of Justice should be given Chevron 
deference in its criminal law interpretations as the Agency that specializes in criminal law. 
Dan M. Kahan, Reallocating Interpretive C riminal-Lawmaking Power Within the 
Executive Branch, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 54 (1998).  This approach, however, 
has not been adopted by the courts. 
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implementation of the tre aty demonstrates a further commit ment to 
these goals.  However, wh en asked to interpret Article 3 of the CAT, 
the BIA and several courts have declined to uphold these aspirations 
by setting an insurmountable barrier to relief fro m removal under the 
CAT.  This barrier is the narrow specific intent definition that 
includes only purposeful conduct, w hich is exacerbated by t he 
requirement that applicants prove a fifty -one percent likeliho od of 
such intent by an applicant’s government.  As the dissent stat ed in In 
re J-E-: 
We are in the early stages of the very difficult and thankless task of 
construing the Convention.  On ly time will tell wheth er the 
majority’s narrow reading of the torture definition and its highly 
technical approach to the standard of proof will be the long-term 
benchmarks for ou r country’s implementation of this international 
treaty.263 
The Obama administration should create a new benchmark for the 
U.S. implementation of the CAT by reversing the BIA’s holding in In 
re J-E- and redefining spe cific intent in Article 3 cases.  This ne w 
definition should include acts that are committed knowing t hat severe 
pain or suffering is a foresee able consequence.  I n the alternative, 
courts should redefine the ter m in these cases, notwithstanding the 
principles of Chevron deference.  This new definition is consistent 
with the legislative history and purpose of the CAT because it allows 
an adjudicator to consider the likely harm to the victim  and does not 
focus only on the intent of the a lleged torturer.  Mo reover, time has 
told that the BIA’s early interpretation of the definition of torture was 
too narrow, especially  given courts’ broader reading of the term  and 
the broader definition of specific intent in the DOJ’s own 2004 memo 
interpreting whether U.S. interrogators  could face prosecution under 
the criminal provisions of the CAT.  The executive branch and courts  
should effectuate the goal s of Article 3 of the CAT for what it is: a 
human rights instru ment that protects victi ms, not prosecutes 
torturers. 
 
263 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 309 (Schmidt, dissenting). 
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